

**ATTACHMENT TO THE STATEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES
REPRESENTATIVE TO THE JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION
COMMISSION AT THE CLOSING PLENARY OF THE TWELFTH SESSION,
DECEMBER 12, 1995^{1, 2}**

I. Unilateral Plenary Statements

The U.S. side appreciates the Russian Federation's timely response to U.S. concerns regarding inspector safety when certain AN-12 inspection airplanes were used that were not equipped to carry passengers to and from Russian inspection sites. The United States recently received assurances through diplomatic channels that measures were being taken to end the use of AN-12 aircraft for the transport of U.S. inspectors. The United States Delegation considers this matter satisfactorily resolved on the basis of these assurances.

The U.S. side was pleased to learn during this session that the Russian Federation confirms that the height dimension of fixed structures for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, which is declared in the MOU, should properly be measured to the extreme point. The U.S. side has concurred with the Russian Federation's proposal for inspectors and in-country escorts to determine on-site the most appropriate methods for measuring to the extreme point of such structures. We will now prepare instructions to our inspectors regarding conducting such measurements at the Kostroma and Bershet' rail garrisons in cooperation with the in-country escort.

The U.S. side is pleased to have received during this session an affirmation from the Russian Federation of the obligation of the in-country escort to demonstrate to the satisfaction of inspectors that an object contained in the front section that is declared not to be a reentry vehicle is not, in fact, a reentry vehicle, pursuant to paragraph 13 of Annex 3 to the Inspection Protocol. The U.S. side notes that specific Treaty procedures are not necessary in order for the inspected party to comply with this obligation.

With regard to B-1B heavy bombers, the United States has met its obligation as called for in the letters exchanged at Treaty signature and has made available for inspection all deployed B-1B heavy bombers. All B-1B heavy bombers will continue to be subject to inspection during future data update inspections in accordance with the provisions of the Inspection Protocol. The United States believes this issue is resolved.

With regard to the soft-site launcher at Vandenberg Test Range, the United States has determined that, in addition to national technical means of verification, the soft-site launcher can be inspected. A new site diagram has been provided that includes the soft-site launcher within the inspectable area. As a result, the United States believes this issue can be closed.

¹ The titles of these sections are not part of the official plenary, but are included for reader convenience.

² Unless otherwise footnoted, all coordinated plenary statements have been issued by all Parties to the Treaty. For security classification reasons, the coordinated statements appearing here represent the U.S. version only.

The item observed by Russian Federation inspectors at the Washington Naval Yard Museum is a static display of an inert mock-up of a Poseidon SLBM that has been in place since 1980. This static display was inadvertently omitted from the list of static displays in existence at the time of signature of the Treaty, and contained in paragraph 1 of Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). The United States will include this inert mock-up in Annex I to the MOU during the next MOU data update.

The device found at the training facility, King's Bay, has not been used for, and was not designed to be used as, a launcher of SLBMs or as a training launcher. It is incapable of storing an SLBM and incapable of being used as an SLBM launcher or as a treaty-defined "training launcher." The United States regards this statement as having resolved this issue.

For structures within the boundary of the inspected facility that are large enough to contain or to be used for items or support equipment subject to inspection or declared for that facility, and the entrances of which are large enough to permit passage of such items or support equipment, but that are not intended for such items or support equipment, such structures need not be depicted on the site diagram for that facility. Not depicting such structures on a site diagram, however, does not affect the rights of the Parties with regard to the inspection of such structures within the boundaries of the inspected facility.

With regard to the Minuteman I ICBM, the United States acknowledges that it is a missile maintained, stored, and transported in stages, and has the same first stage dimensions as the U.S. existing types of ICBMs, the Minuteman II and III. In accordance with paragraph 18 of Section I of the Notification Protocol, the United States declares the number and location of the limited number of Minuteman I ICBMs every six months. As appropriate during pre-inspection briefings, the United States indicates the number of Minuteman I ICBMs located at the inspected facility. The United States believes that the declarations and notifications for the Minuteman I ICBM should be guided by the Treaty provisions, especially the Thirty-Seventh Agreed Statement, concerning former types. In order to facilitate the inspectors' ability to identify the Minuteman I ICBM, the United States has placed decals on the first stages of the Minuteman I ICBM, similar to the type and location of the decals used to identify the first stages of the Minuteman II and III ICBMs.

II. Coordinated Plenary Statements

The United States notes that the Minuteman II and Minuteman III ICBMs use the same first stage, and hence by their appearance and dimensions are indistinguishable. To facilitate counting the number of Minuteman II and III ICBMs by inspectors, the United States has affixed a permanent decal to the aft end dome of the motor case of the first stages of Minuteman II and Minuteman III ICBMs, using roman numerals II or III, thus identifying the missile as a Minuteman II or Minuteman III ICBMs, respectively. The United States further notes that, for the purpose of counting first stages of Minuteman II and Minuteman III ICBMs to determine whether the number of first stages of Minuteman II and Minuteman III ICBMs present at an inspected facility

corresponds to the number declared by the inspected party, inspectors may use these decals to identify the missile type.

The Parties will record agreements on changes to the boundaries of facilities on site diagrams, provided for in paragraphs 19 and 20 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), as JCIC Joint Statements with a separate number sequence prefaced by S- (Number of Joint Statement).

The United States has no further questions regarding the Bershet' ICBM Base for Rail-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs, based on the understanding that the rail spurs not depicted on the site diagram of the rail garrison that are located north of the exit/entrance of the facility and are connected to the main rail line, will not be used to base, store or maintain items of inspection or support equipment that are declared for this facility.¹

**UNCLASSIFIED ATTACHMENT TO THE U.S. CLOSING PLENARY
STATEMENT FOR JCIC-XIII, MAY 15, 1996**

I. Coordinated Plenary Statements

On Heavy Bomber Attachment Joints

The third attachment joint at the inboard pylon position under each wing of the TU-95MS16 Russian heavy bomber known to the United States as the Bear-H16, and attachment joints on the 3MS-2 Russian former heavy bomber known to the United States as the Bison-B, are not now, and are not intended to be used in the future for attaching long-range nuclear ALCMs or pylons for long-range nuclear ALCMs.

Two attachment joints for an additional pylon on selected B-52H heavy bombers, described by the United States to support an electronic instrumentation package, are not now and are not intended to be used in the future for attaching long-range nuclear ALCMs or pylons for long-range nuclear ALCMs. To show that these attachment joints cannot be used to attach long-range nuclear ALCMs or pylons for long-range nuclear ALCMs, the United States will provide inspectors the opportunity to make linear measurements of the distance between attachment joints for this pylon on the wing if such attachment joints are present and if questions are raised about them during future inspections of these heavy bombers.

Weapon pylons used for carrying non-nuclear weapons may be attached to the attachment joints for pylons for long-range nuclear ALCMs on B-52H heavy bombers.

On Procedures for Elimination of Russian Liquid-Propellant SLBMs

The United States understands that Russian liquid-propellant SLBMs shall be considered to have been rendered inoperable, precluding their use for their original purpose, after carrying out the procedures listed below at START-declared facilities:

¹ The coordinated plenary statement on the Bershet' ICBM Base was issued by the United States and the Russian Federation.

- Guidance system elements have been removed;
- Fuel tanks have been depressurized by cutting out the plugs in fuel and drain ports;
- Propellant components have been drained and fuel tanks neutralized;
- Two holes of no less than 10-15 millimeters in diameter have been drilled (pressed) through the main engine nozzle;
- SLBM airframes with drained propellant components have been placed in open areas visible to NTM for no less than 60 days.

On Procedures for the Elimination of First Stages without Nozzles Attached of U.S. ICBMs and SLBMs

The Parties note that the Joint Statement on First Stages without Nozzles Attached of U.S. ICBMs and SLBMs does not affect the procedures for elimination of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs provided for in paragraph 4 of Section I of the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of the Items Subject to the START Treaty.

II. U.S. Unilateral Plenary Statements

On Confirming Types of Partially-Assembled Missiles

Inspectors are likely to encounter first stages in both partially-assembled and separated configurations during data update inspections at U.S. ICBM repair facilities and submarine bases. The United States invites its Treaty Partners to take advantage of opportunities during inspections in the coming months to reconfirm and compare the lengths of first stages in partially-assembled and separated configurations.

Barring unforeseen circumstances, the United States will have available for measurement both partially-assembled missiles and separate first stages for comparison during the next data update inspections at the following facilities: Hill ICBM Repair Facility for Minuteman II and III ICBMs, Silverdale Submarine Base for Trident I SLBMs; and at the Kings Bay Submarine Base for Trident II SLBMs. All three locations routinely have on hand their respective missiles in such configurations, which would allow the necessary measurements and confirmation of first stage attachment points.

On Measuring the First Stages without Nozzles Attached of SS-24 ICBMs

As the U.S. indicated prior to initialling of the Joint Statement on First Stages without Nozzles Attached of SS-24 ICBMs, nothing in this Joint Statement affects the right of the U.S. during inspections of SS-24 ICBMs at conversion or elimination facilities to measure all elements and assemblies of SS-24 ICBMs that constitute the length of the missile without front sections.

On Minutemen I Missile Distinguishability

The U.S. Minuteman I ICBM, a former type of ICBM, has the same first stage dimension as the U.S. existing types of ICBMs, the Minuteman II and Minuteman III. In accordance with paragraph 18 of Section I of the Protocol on

Notifications Relating to the Treaty, the United States declares the number and location of the limited number of Minuteman I ICBMs every six months. There are currently 26 Minuteman I first stages in the United States inventory. This number will either remain static or decline. As appropriate during pre-inspection briefings, the United States indicates the number of Minuteman I ICBMs located at the inspected facility. Additionally, the United States has placed decals on the first stages of the Minuteman I ICBM, identical to the type of decal placed on the first stages of the Minuteman II and Minuteman III ICBMs, in order to facilitate the inspectors' ability to identify the Minuteman I ICBM.

The United States is pleased that the Russian Federation has accepted that the Minuteman I is subject to the provisions of the 37th Agreed Statement as a former type of ICBM, including the six month locational notifications. However, having done so, it is not logical for Russia to assert that a Minuteman I is a Minuteman III. There are no practical consequences to this disagreement because neither non-deployed Minuteman I or Minuteman III ICBMs are numerically limited under the Treaty. It is the oldest, least capable ICBM in the U.S. inventory and suitable for no other purpose than certain research and development testing.

On Solid Rocket Eliminations at Perm'

The U.S. Delegation was pleased to receive, during discussions at JCIC-XIII, assurances from the Russian Federation that the eliminations of ICBMs and SLBMs at the proposed Perm' Conversion or Elimination Facility would be consistent with obligations under the START Treaty, and that the U.S. and Russia will continue to consult with each other as this process proceeds. The U.S. Delegation will report these assurances to the Department of Defense's Cooperative Threat Reduction personnel. We look forward to the successful accomplishment of our mutual objectives in this area. We note that the presence of even a limited number of mobile ICBMs at Perm', without observing the locational restrictions of the Treaty, would be inconsistent with such assurances.

On Procedures for Elimination of Russian Liquid-Propellant ICBMs

The United States appreciates the clarification provided by the Russian Delegation pertaining to the Russian liquid-propellant ICBM elimination process referred to as "rendered inoperable by cutting" in START Notification Format 59 to mean cutting through the missile's fuel tank, and understands that SS-11, SS-13, SS-17, and SS-18 ICBMs, rendered inoperable by cutting, will be considered to have been eliminated, thereby precluding their use for their original purpose.

On Modifications to B-1B Pylon Attachment Joint Covers

The United States, in connection with the requirements set forth in the START Treaty letters exchanged on July 31, 1991, declares its intention to modify the pylon attachment joint covers on all operational B-1B heavy bombers. This modification will include an enhancement to the bonding process and removal of the pliable aerofairing sealant. The U.S. is forced to make this modification to resolve safety concerns brought on by engineering design deficiencies recently discovered in the current attachment joint covering process.

For inspection purposes, there is a minor change to the outward appearance of the pylon attachment joint covers. Pliable aerofairing sealant will be removed from around the edge of the replacement covers, and a drain hole in the circular replacement cover will not be filled with bonding material. These alterations will be clearly visible to future inspection teams.

The U.S. is in the process of retrofitting the entire operational B-1B fleet with this modification. This process will take approximately 6 months. This modification would normally take place at the B-1B Repair Facility. However, because of overriding safety concerns, this modification will take place at both the repair facility and the operational B-1B bases, in order to expedite its completion.

This modification will not alter the warhead attribution, nor the START Treaty status of the B-1B as a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs.

On Additional Differences Between Training Models of the SS-N-8 and SS-N-18 Types of Missiles and SLBMs of the Corresponding Type

The United States recognizes that any training nozzle or nozzle-like component attached to SS-N-8 and SS-N-18 training models of missiles at the place where a nozzle of the first stage rocket motor would normally be located on the corresponding type of SLBM, will have two holes, each no less than ten millimeters in diameter, drilled through such a training nozzle or nozzle-like component.

On Site Diagrams for Bershet' Silo ICBM Base, Engel's Air Base, and Ukrainka Air Base

The United States has no objections with the site diagrams for the Bershet' Silo ICBM Base dated November 1, 1995; the Engel's Air Base dated January 22, 1996; and the Ukrainka Air Base dated January 22, 1996.

**COORDINATED PLENARY STATEMENTS BY THE UNITED STATES
REPRESENTATIVE TO THE JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION
COMMISSION AT THE CLOSING PLENARY OF THE FOURTEENTH
SESSION, OCTOBER 30, 1996**

**Regarding Relocation of Items Placed on Static Display Prior to Treaty
Signature**

The Parties have reviewed their practice regarding relocation of items placed on static display prior to START Treaty signature and concluded that such static display items are not subject to the limitations of the Treaty but are listed in Annex I of the Memorandum of Understanding to avoid ambiguity with items placed on static display after the Treaty was signed. In order to avoid ambiguities, the Parties intend to provide goodwill notifications of such relocations to their Treaty Partners. Such notifications will be provided through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers or other equivalent continuous communications channels using Format 144.

The notification will include the type of static display item, the location from which the static display item will be moved, the planned date of the initiation of dismantling of such an item, the name and coordinates of the location where such item will be placed on static display or eliminated, and whether such item will be placed on static display or eliminated. In addition, the change in Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding will be reflected in the next six-month update of the Annexes to the Memorandum of Understanding.

Regarding Channels for Asking and Answering Telemetry Questions

The Parties have reviewed the practices of asking and answering questions regarding telemetric information and confirm their intention to continue the practice of asking questions relating to the incompleteness or insufficient quality of telemetric information recorded on the tapes that do not allow processing of such information, by providing notifications in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section VI of the Notification Protocol through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers or other equivalent continuous communications channels using Format 81.

The Parties will provide answers to questions contained in such a notification through diplomatic channels in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Telemetry Protocol. Diplomatic channels will also be used for asking and answering questions relating to the incompleteness or insufficient quality of telemetry interpretive data or acceleration profiles.

The Parties note that questions and answers on interpretive data and acceleration profiles must be provided as quickly as possible. Consideration of proposals for establishing time limits for asking and answering such questions will be continued later, taking into account the experience gained.

On Telemetry Tape Costs

The Parties have reviewed the practices relating to telemetry tape costs and have concluded that the rate for telemetry tapes should remain as reflected in the Treaty, that is, zero U.S. dollars per tape. The Parties have reached an understanding that bills which have already been drawn up and paid should not be changed, but that all future bills, including current unpaid bills, should be drawn up using zero U.S. dollars as the rate per tape, unless otherwise agreed.

UNILATERAL STATEMENTS DELIVERED WITH THE U.S. PLENARY STATEMENT AT THE CLOSING PLENARY MEETING OF THE FIFTEENTH JCIC SESSION, HELD AT THE U.S. MISSION, JUNE 18, 1997

Unilateral Statements

The U.S. Delegation urges Ukraine to permit U.S. inspectors to perform the measurements provided for in the Joint Draft Text on Measuring SS-24 ICBMs with Coupling Device Attached, should they encounter an SS-24 ICBM or its first stage in the configurations provided for in that document during inspections at conversion or elimination facilities, pending the finalization of that document at the next session of the JCIC. This will facilitate inspections and the completion of the document.

During the fifteenth session of the JCIC, we have engaged in useful discussions on the issue of Minuteman III RVOSI. The United States continues to believe that its practices are Treaty-compliant; however, since the conduct of RV inspections began, the United States has instituted additional confidence-building measures in response to concerns expressed by Russian inspectors about RVOSI of Minuteman III ICBMs.

These measures have included viewing the lower portion of the Minuteman III front section through the view ports in the vehicle's environmental flaps while the front section is suspended inside the vehicle and lifting portions of the maintenance safety screen around the base of the front section to permit inspectors to view the length of the entire front section. In addition, at the request of an inspection team, escort personnel loosened the RV cover lanyards to allow the soft RV covers to drape over the top of the RVs in order to demonstrate the approximate size and shape of the reentry vehicles and that the covers were not suspended over empty space.

Continued implementation of these additional measures assure that the Russian Federation can confirm that the Minuteman III ICBM carries no more reentry vehicles than the three with which it is attributed in the Treaty. The United States believes this should fully resolve Russian concerns.

The U.S. has reviewed the concerns expressed by the Russian Federation with regard to the preparation for viewing of the Peacekeeper front section during the April 14, 1997, RVOSI conducted at F.E. Warren Air Force Base. The

United States regards this method of presentation for the Peacekeeper front section as complying with the requirements of Annex 3 of the Inspection Protocol. To alleviate the concerns expressed by the Russian Federation, the U.S. Delegation has provided its Treaty Partners with a photograph of the configuration in which the front section was viewed. The United States assures its Treaty Partners that it will continue to prepare the Peacekeeper front section for viewing during RVOSI in the manner illustrated in that photograph.

**ANNEX TO THE U.S. CLOSING PLENARY STATEMENT FOR JCIC-XVI,
NOVEMBER 12, 1997**

**JCIC-XVI Coordinated Plenary Language on Data Associated with the
Analysis of Telemetric Information**

For telemetric information that is broadcast during a flight test, except for telemetric information that is broadcast from a reentry vehicle, the United States notes that it will include, inter alia, the interpretive data specified in subparagraphs 1(a) (vi) and 1 (a) (vii) of Section II of the Telemetry Protocol for all data elements occupying more than one standard telemetry word.

**UNCLASSIFIED ATTACHMENT TO THE STATEMENT BY THE UNITED
STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE JOINT COMPLIANCE AND
INSPECTION COMMISSION AT THE CLOSING PLENARY OF THE
SEVENTEENTH SESSION, MARCH 18, 1998**

Coordinated Statement on the Beginning of Acceleration Profiles

The United States notes that a missile acceleration profile to be provided pursuant to paragraph 2 of Section II of the Telemetry Protocol will begin no later than the time of ignition of the first stage motor of the missile and will cover the periods during which the stages or self-contained dispensing mechanism are imparting acceleration to the missile. It also notes that the provisions of paragraph 5 of Annex 2 to the Telemetry Protocol are used in determining the point in time when such a profile terminates.

If due to any circumstances the United States is unable to provide telemetric information containing data necessary to determine missile acceleration, the calculated missile acceleration profile to be provided may begin from the point in time when the missile begins its movement relative to its launching device.

UNCLASSIFIED ATTACHMENT TO THE STATEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION AT THE CLOSING PLENARY OF THE SEVENTEENTH SESSION, MARCH 18, 1998

Unilateral Statement by the United States of America

Missile acceleration profiles, derived from either estimated or measured data, will begin no later than the time of ignition of the first stage motor. The United States has no plans to change its current practice of providing either measured or estimated missile acceleration profiles for Trident SLBMs beginning at a point in time not later than first stage motor ignition. The United States notes that the formulation in today's plenary statements regarding providing acceleration profiles allows, but does not require, the testing Party to provide a missile acceleration profile beginning when the missile begins its movement relative to its launching device.

UNCLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS TO U.S. CLOSING PLENARY STATEMENT FOR JCIC-XVIII, JULY 29, 1998

Unilateral U.S. Statement In Connection with Joint Statement Number 30

In connection with initialing Joint Statement Number 30, the United States confirms its understanding of the locations where Russia and Ukraine are currently eliminating non-mobile ICBMs and SLBMs.

It is the U.S. understanding that Russian SS-11 and SS-19 ICBMs are eliminated only at the Piban'shur Storage Facility, SS-17 and SS-18 ICBMs are eliminated only at the Surovatikha Storage Facility, and Russian SLBMs are eliminated only at the Pashino Conversion or Elimination Facility, the Revda Storage Facility, and the Krasnoyarsk Machine Building Plant.

It is the U.S. understanding that Ukraine eliminates non-mobile ICBMs at the Mikhaylenki Storage Facility and the Southern Machine Building Plant at Dnepropetrovsk.

Unilateral U.S. Statement Related to Reimbursement of Early Exhibition Costs

The United States understands that the question of reimbursement by the United States of costs relating to the conduct of early exhibitions under the START Treaty for the amount of USD \$57,205.20 has been resolved to the mutual satisfaction of the Parties. Pursuant to the agreement among the successor States to the former Soviet Union, the United States will reimburse the sum to the Russian Federation.

Coordinated Plenary Statement on Providing Calculated Missile Acceleration Profiles

The Russian non-paper of June 30, 1998, provided in the Telemetry Working Group during JCIC-XVIII, contains examples of how a missile acceleration profile would be supplemented with data calculated on the basis of engineering estimates for periods during which no relevant on-board or external measurements were obtained.

For ICBM and SLBM flight tests conducted beginning as of the date of this statement, the United States of America intends to supplement the missile acceleration profiles which are to be provided pursuant to paragraph 2 of Section II of the Telemetry Protocol with missile acceleration data calculated on the basis of engineering estimates using as a model the data set forth in the Russian non-paper of June 30, 1998, for all or any portion of a flight test for which a missile acceleration profile is required, but no relevant on-board or external measurements were obtained. All periods for which missile acceleration data calculated on the basis of engineering estimates are provided will be indicated on the missile acceleration profiles.

UNCLASSIFIED ANNEX TO THE STATEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION AT THE CLOSING PLENARY OF THE TWENTIETH SESSION, JULY 28, 1999**Coordinated Statement On the Return of Space Launch Vehicles to National Territory**

In conjunction with JCIC Joint Statement Number 32, should it be necessary to return an ICBM or SLBM used to deliver objects into the upper atmosphere or space, including a space launch vehicle that incorporates the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM, from a space launch facility declared outside national territory to its national territory, the United States will provide the other Parties through diplomatic channels, or through their respective continuous communication centers, no less than five days in advance of the scheduled date of departure of such a space launch vehicle from that space launch facility, the following information: the type of space launch vehicle involved; the space launch facility from which the space launch vehicle is to depart; the anticipated date of departure; the mode of transport; the facility to which such a space launch vehicle is to be transported; and the anticipated date of its arrival at this facility.

Coordinated Statement On Blackjack Heavy Bomber Elimination¹

The United States notes that the procedures conducted pursuant to subparagraphs 5(a), 5(b) and 5(c) respectively of Section VI of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, at the locations used in the elimination of Ukrainian Blackjack Heavy Bomber Number 24, were consistent with the provisions of Section VI of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.

¹ Issued by the United States and Ukraine.

The United States notes that the procedures conducted pursuant to subparagraphs 5(a), 5(b) and 5(c) respectively of Section VI of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, at the locations used in the elimination of Ukrainian Blackjack Heavy Bomber Number 14, were consistent with the provisions of Section VI of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.

The United States will accept as Treaty compliant the use of these same sets of elimination procedures for future eliminations of Blackjack type heavy bombers.

Coordinated Statement On Providing Tail Numbers of Heavy Bombers During Conversion or Elimination Inspections¹

During pre-inspection procedures, the United States will, as a matter of goodwill, provide to the inspection team that has arrived to conduct an elimination inspection the tail number of each heavy bomber that is to be inspected during that inspection. This information will be confirmed during that inspection and will be specified in the inspection report.

Unilateral Statement On Mobile Launchers Containing Training Models of Missiles at Plesetsk²

The United States of America notes the intention of the Russian Federation to include, within the boundaries of the Plesetsk Test Range, the area that is currently declared as the Plesetsk Training Facility for ICBMs. With regard to non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs containing training models of missiles, the United States of America notes that the position of the Russian Federation is that the Treaty does not prohibit the location of such launchers at any declared facility. The position of the United States of America is that subparagraph 2(c) of Article IV prohibits locating non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs that contain training models of missiles outside a training facility. However, recognizing the unique status of the Plesetsk Test Range as reflected in the Fifteenth Agreed Statement, the United States of America, as a matter of policy and without prejudice to its legal position, will not object to the continued location of no more than 20 such mobile launchers of ICBMs at the Plesetsk Test Range.

UNCLASSIFIED ADDENDUM TO THE UNCLASSIFIED ANNEX TO THE STATEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION AT THE CLOSING PLENARY OF THE TWENTIETH SESSION, JULY 28, 1999

U.S. Unilateral Statement On Reducing the Timeframe for Heavy Bomber Elimination Inspections

The United States appreciates Ukraine's interest in disposing of the remains of airframes of heavy bombers in a prompt manner. The United States will

¹ Issued by the United States, the Russian Federation and Ukraine.

² The United States withdrew this statement at JCIC-XXII on July 26, 2000.

expedite its inspections of these heavy bombers to confirm their elimination pursuant to the START Treaty. The exact scheduling of such inspections can only be determined as eliminations occur. The United States notes that it intends to inspect the bombers in batches of no less than five (5) per inspection. The United States plans to inspect the remains of batches of eliminated bombers within fourteen (14) days of notification of elimination of the fifth eliminated bomber not previously inspected. After completion of such inspections, Ukraine could immediately move the remains of the airframes to another site, pursuant to paragraph 7 of section VI of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.

**UNCLASSIFIED ANNEX TO THE STATEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES
REPRESENTATIVE TO THE JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION
COMMISSION AT THE CLOSING PLENARY OF THE TWENTY-FIRST
SESSION, MARCH 8, 2000**

Coordinated Statement on the Nenoksa Space Launch Facility¹

The United States of America accepts the revised site diagram for the Nenoksa SLBM Test Range dated December 5, 1994. The United States of America understands that the Russian Federation will allow inspectors of the United States of America a one-time entry onto the territory removed from the area of the Nenoksa SLBM Test Range and declared as the Nenoksa Space Launch Facility, as part of the next data update inspection at the Nenoksa SLBM Test Range.

Coordinated Statement on Changes in the Function of a Facility

The United States of America understands that the provisions of JCIC Joint Statement Number 17 on Changes in the Functions of Facilities apply only to a change in the function of an entire facility. Joint Statement Number 17 does not provide for a change in the function of a portion of a facility or for a change in the boundaries of a facility. A change in the function of a portion of a facility would be accomplished by using the provisions of either paragraph 19 or paragraph 20 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding to exclude that portion from within the boundary of the site diagram of the old facility and by declaring, either prior to or coincident with such exclusion, that such excluded portion of the old facility is a new facility or incorporated into another existing facility.

**Coordinated Statement on Consultations Related to Declaring Space
Launch Facilities Outside National Territory**

The United States of America, noting that the Parties to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, share a common commitment to promoting effective verification of Treaty obligations and to ensuring non-proliferation of

¹ Issued by the United States and the Russian Federation.

ballistic missile technology, intends to engage in consultations with other Parties to the Treaty within the framework of the JCIC or through diplomatic channels at least 120 days prior to providing a notification containing a declaration of the existence of a new space launch facility outside its national territory. The objective of these consultations will be to inform the other Parties in advance concerning such notifications.

The United States of America intends to provide to the other Parties during the course of such consultations information on the name and location of the space launch facility being declared, including a geographic reference point or points, not to exceed four, for each such space launch facility. Geographic coordinates will be specified using the criteria of paragraph 1 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty.

The United States of America also intends to provide information on the planned date of declaration of the facility, the expected duration of its use, and the type or types of ICBMs or SLBMs used to deliver objects into the upper atmosphere or space, including space launch vehicles that incorporate the first stages of ICBMs or SLBMs, hereinafter referred to as space launch vehicles, that are planned to be moved to that space launch facility.

The United States of America acknowledges that there is no requirement under the Treaty to agree in advance within the framework of the JCIC or through diplomatic channels on plans pertaining to the declaration of a space launch facility outside its national territory. Such consultations will not affect the Party's right to declare space launch facilities in accordance with the Treaty, or in any way impede legitimate activities in rendering commercial space launch services.

The United States of America intends to locate space launch vehicles, launchers, launch canisters and support equipment, as well as the remains of eliminated launch canisters, within five kilometers of a geographic reference point specified above, or, if located further than this distance from any geographic reference point, provide the geographic coordinates for such items specified in minutes of latitude and longitude.

The United States of America, pursuant to Joint Statement Number 21, intends, if it declares a space launch facility outside its national territory, to take all appropriate measures, including reaching agreement with the government of the State on whose territory the space launch facility being declared will be located, to retain ownership and control of its space launch vehicles, as well as their launchers, support equipment, and launch canisters, while they are in transit and while they are located at that space launch facility. The United States of America also intends to ensure that space launch vehicles, their launchers and support equipment are operated by its personnel at that space launch facility.

**UNCLASSIFIED ATTACHMENT UNILATERAL PLENARY STATEMENT BY
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CONCERNING REENTRY VEHICLE
INSPECTIONS AND COOPERATIVE MEASURES FOR SS-25 ICBMS BASED
AT DROVYANAYA AND YOSHKAR-OLA, AUGUST 2, 2000**

Taking into account the temporary fiscal constraints that have delayed the completion of fixed structures at Drovyanaya Restricted Area Number 2 (RA-2) and Yoshkar-Ola Restricted Area Number 4 (RA-4), the United States, as a matter of policy, will utilize, as a practical measure during this temporary situation, the procedures proposed by the Russian Federation in Variant II of its non-paper of June 28, 1999, to provide access for reentry vehicle inspections (RVOSIs) and to apply cooperative measures to the nine deployed road-mobile launchers and their associated SS-25 ICBMs at the Drovyanaya ICBM Base for Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs and the nine deployed road-mobile launchers and their associated SS-25 ICBMs at the Yoshkar-Ola ICBM Base for Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs, that are currently declared to be at such restricted areas (RAs) pursuant to Article VI of the Treaty but are temporarily housed in the maintenance facilities for those ICBM bases.

During the period in which this practical measure is used, any RVOSI or cooperative measures requested for the relevant portion of one of these maintenance facilities will also be applied, simultaneously, to any fixed structures existing or under construction in the corresponding RA, the boundaries of which are defined in the January 1, 1999, site diagrams for those RAs.

Consistent with the temporary nature of this practical arrangement, the United States of America intends to conduct a review within the framework of the JCIC of the progress made toward construction of fixed structures at these two RAs approximately two years from this date. Based on the results of that review, the United States would assess the suitability of continuing this arrangement.

The United States of America notes that that practical measure does not set a precedent for addressing its concerns regarding any future activities. Any extension by the Russian Federation of the practice of temporarily housing road-mobile launchers at locations other than their declared RAs for other RAs or other deployed mobile ICBMs, or to allow less than the full exercise of the proposed procedures for the inspection and cooperative measures for these ICBMs would cause the United States of America to cease implementing this practical measure.

**UNILATERAL STATEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES ON THE OCCASION
OF THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF JCIC AGREEMENT NUMBER 44 AND JCIC
JOINT STATEMENT NUMBER 34, DECEMBER 11, 2000**

The United States interprets JCIC Agreement Number 44 on "Phased Elimination of ICBMs for Mobile Launchers of ICBMs," as providing the Treaty basis for the Parties to agree on phased elimination procedures for the mobile

ICBMs of a Party if that Party requests to use phased elimination for its mobile ICBMs. The United States has signed this Agreement without prejudice to its position that the provisions of the Treaty's Conversion or Elimination Protocol apply only to the first stage of the Peacekeeper ICBM, which is considered to be an ICBM pursuant to subparagraph 3(a) of Article III of the Treaty.

At this time, Ukraine has requested to use phased elimination for its SS-24 ICBMs and the Parties have agreed on such procedures for these ICBMs. For its part, the United States has no intention of using, nor could it be obligated to use, phased elimination for its Peacekeeper ICBMs.

**UNILATERAL STATEMENT BY THE RUSSIAN SIDE IN CONNECTION WITH
THE STATEMENT BY STEVEN STEINER, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE
JCIC, AT THE SIGNING OF THE JCIC DOCUMENTS ON DECEMBER 11,
2000**

In connection with the unilateral statement by Steven Steiner, U.S. Representative to the JCIC, regarding the U.S. position with respect to the elimination of Peacekeeper ICBMs, made at today's signing of the JCIC Agreement on "Phased Elimination of ICBMs for Mobile Launchers of ICBMs" and the JCIC Joint Statement on "Phased Elimination of SS-24 ICBMs Located in Ukraine," I have been instructed to confirm the Russian Federation's position of principle concerning elimination of U.S. Peacekeeper ICBMs, which was set forth in detail in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission in connection with the START Treaty.

Specifically, according to this position of the Russian Federation, mobile ICBMs must be eliminated as provided for in Section I of the Protocol on Conversion or Elimination of the Items subject to the START Treaty, that is, completely and with verification, regardless of the classification of these missiles.

**UNILATERAL STATEMENT BY THE UKRAINIAN SIDE IN CONNECTION
WITH THE SIGNING OF JCIC DOCUMENTS, DECEMBER 11, 2000**

Today, the JCIC has finalized the documents that constitute the legal basis for the implementation of phased elimination of SS-24 ICBMs in Ukraine.

The signature of the JCIC Agreement on "Phased Elimination of ICBMs for Mobile Launchers of ICBMs," and the initialing of the JCIC Joint Statement "On Phased Elimination of SS-24 ICBMs Located in Ukraine" mark the culmination of a lengthy and intensive negotiating process during which all the Parties were extremely constructive and flexible. In this connection, I have been instructed to convey the Ukrainian side's gratitude to the Parties for their understanding of the important issues before them, and for their readiness to assist in seeking solutions.

**UNILATERAL STATEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES ON THE OCCASION
OF THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF JCIC AGREEMENT NUMBER 44 AND JCIC
JOINT STATEMENT NUMBER 34, DECEMBER 11, 2000**

The United States emphasizes that agreements and procedures for Phased Elimination will deviate from the requirements of Section I of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol only in terms of timing or sequencing, and that all substantive rights and obligations in the START Treaty, including all elimination, inspection and attribution requirements, will continue to apply.

**UNCLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS TO U.S. CLOSING PLENARY STATEMENT
FOR JCIC-XXIV, MARCH 20, 2002**

**Coordinated Plenary Statement on Disablement Beyond Repair of an SLBM
or ICBM Other than an ICBM for Mobile Launchers of ICBMs**

The United States of America understands that in the event that an SLBM or an ICBM other than an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs is disabled beyond repair, the United States of America may provide a START Format 5 notification that will include a statement of the circumstances related to the disablement. The United States of America understands that such an SLBM or such an ICBM remains accountable as an SLBM or ICBM until such time as it is eliminated pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article VII of the Treaty. Upon elimination of such an SLBM or such an ICBM, the United States of America will provide a START Format 64 notification in accordance with paragraph 4(e) of Section IV of the Notification Protocol. The United States of America further understands that if a Format 5 notification has been provided with respect to that missile and until the elimination of such a missile in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article VII of the Treaty, the United States of America, in its Notifications of Updated Data in each of the categories contained in the Memorandum of Understanding, will identify such a missile as being disabled beyond repair by use of an asterisk after the total number of such missiles and by a footnote at the end of the Memorandum of Understanding entry for the facility for which the missile is declared. This footnote will indicate that such missile has been declared disabled beyond repair and will include the location of such missile.

**Coordinated Statement by the Representative of the United States of
America at JCIC-XXIV on Measuring Launch Canisters Contained in or
Located on a Mobile Launcher¹**

As a matter of policy and without prejudice to the U.S. legal position concerning paragraph 6 of Annex 1 to the START Treaty's Inspection Protocol, the United States will make one annual measurement of an SS-25 launch canister located on a road-mobile launcher; one annual measurement of the launch canister of each variant of the SS-25 ICBM, including the RS-12M Variant 2, located on a mobile launcher; and one annual measurement of the launch canister of each new type of mobile ICBM contained in or located on a mobile

¹ Issued by the United States and the Russian Federation.

launcher. The United States understands that the Russian Federation will permit these annual measurements to be made during data update inspections on launch canisters contained in or located on deployed or non-deployed mobile launchers, as designated by the inspecting Party. In addition, the United States understands that the Russian Federation will provide photographs of assemblies and components that uniquely associate the launch canister and launcher for each variant of the SS-25 ICBM, including the RS-12M Variant 2, and for each new type of mobile ICBM.