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arrow A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement
February 1996

I. Introduction
II. Advancing Our Interests Through Engagement and Enlargement
III. Integrated Regional Approaches
IV. Conclusions
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II. Advancing our Interests Through Engagement and Enlargement
A new international era presents the United States with many distinct dangers, but also with a generally improved security environment and a range of opportunities to improve it further. The preeminent threat that dominated our engagement during the Cold War has been replaced by a complex set of challenges. Our nation’s strategy for defining and addressing those challenges has several core principles that guide our policies to safeguard American security, prosperity and fundamental values. First and foremost, we must exercise global leadership. We are not the world’s policeman, but as the word’s premier economic and military power, and with the strength of our democratic values, U.S. engagement is indispensable to the forging of stable political relations and open trade to advance our interests.

Our leadership must stress preventive diplomacy -- through such means as support for democracy, economic assistance, overseas military presence, interaction between U.S. and foreign militaries and involvement in multilateral negotiations in the Middle East and elsewhere -- in order to help resolve problems, reduce tensions and defuse conflicts before they become crises. These measures are a wise investment in our national security because they offer the prospect of resolving problems with the least human and material cost.

Our engagement must be selective, focusing on the challenges that are most important our own interests and focusing our resources where we can make the most difference. We must also use the right tools -- being willing to act unilaterally when our direct national interests are most at stake; in alliance and partnership when our interests are shared by others; and multilaterally when our interests are more general and the problems are best addressed by the international community.

In all cases, the nature of our response must depend on what best serves our own long-term national interests. Those interests are ultimately defined by our security requirements. Such requirements start with our physical defense and economic well-being. They also include environmental security as well as the security of our values achieved through expansion of the community of democratic nations.

Our national security strategy draws upon a range of political, military and economic instruments, and focuses on the primary objectives that President Clinton has stressed throughout his Administration:

Enhancing Our Security.
Taking account of the realities of the new international era with its array of new threats, a military capability appropriately sized and postured to meet the diverse needs of our strategy, including the ability, in concert with regional allies, to win two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts. We will continue to pursue a combination of diplomatic, economic and defense efforts, including arms control agreements, to reduce the danger of nuclear, chemical, biological and conventional conflict and to promote stability.

Promoting Prosperity at Home.
A vigorous and integrated economic policy designed to put our own economic house in order, work toward free and open markets abroad and promote sustainable development.

Promoting Democracy.
A framework of democratic enlargement that increases our security by protecting, consolidating and enlarging the community of free market democracies. Our efforts focus on strengthening democratic processes in key emerging democratic states including Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, Ukraine and other new independent states of the former Soviet Union.

In order to advance these objectives, we must remain engaged in the world through U.S. leadership, with our national security strategy based on enlarging the world community of secure, democratic and free market nations. Overall, this makes the world a safer and more prosperous place and in so doing directly advances our interests. Nations that feel secure due to our engagement overseas are more likely to support free trade and democratic institutions, thereby enhancing U.S. security and prosperity; nations with growing and open economies and strong ties to the United States are more likely to feel secure and to be unafraid of freedom, thereby not threatening us or others; and democratic states with similar values are less likely to threaten one anothers’ interests, and are more likely to cooperate in confronting mutual security threats and in promoting free and open trade and economic development.

The three basic objectives of our national security strategy will also guide the allocation of our limited national security resources. Because deficit reduction is also central to the long-term health and competitiveness of the American economy, we have made it, along with efficient and environmentally sound use of our resources, a major priority. Under the Clinton economic plan, the federal budget deficit has been lowered as a percentage of the Gross Domestic Product from 4.9 percent in Fiscal Year 1992 to 2.4 percent in Fiscal Year 1995 -- the lowest since 1979.

Enhancing our Security

The U.S. government is responsible for protecting the lives and personal safety of Americans, maintaining our political freedom and independence as a nation and promoting the well-being and prosperity of our nation. No matter how powerful we are as a nation, we cannot always secure these basic goals unilaterally. Whether the problem is nuclear proliferation, regional instability, the reversal of reform in the former Soviet empire, international crime and terrorism, or unfair trade practices, the threats and challenges we face frequently demand cooperative, multinational solutions. Therefore, the only responsible U.S. strategy is one that seeks to ensure U.S. influence over and participation in collective decisionmaking in a wide and growing range of circumstances.

An important element of our security preparedness depends on durable relationships with allies and other friendly nations. Accordingly, a central thrust of our strategy of engagement is to sustain and adapt the security relationships we have with key nations around the world. These ties constitute an important part of an international framework that will be essential to ensuring cooperation across a broad range of issues. Within the realm of security issues, our cooperation with allies and friendly nations includes such activities as: conducting combined training and exercises, coordinating military plans and preparations, sharing intelligence -- particularly in support of multilateral peacekeeping efforts or initiatives to contain the inimical behavior of rogue states -- jointly developing new systems to include cooperative research and development programs and controlling exports of sensitive technologies according to common standards.

The new era presents a different set of threats to our security. In this new period, enhancing American security requires, first and foremost, developing and maintaining a strong defense capability of forces ready to fight. We are developing integrated approaches for dealing with threats arising from the development of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction by other nations. Our security also requires a vigorous arms control effort and a strong intelligence capability. We have implemented a strategy for multilateral peace operations. We have clarified rigorous guidelines for when and how to use military force in this era.

We also face security risks that are not solely military in nature. An emerging class of transnational environmental and natural resource issues, and rapid population growth and refugee flows, are increasingly affecting international stability and consequently will present new challenges to U.S. strategy. Other increasingly interconnected, transnational phenomena such as terrorism, narcotics trafficking and organized crime also have security implications both for present and long-term American policy: the destructive forces we face inside our borders often have their origins overseas in rogue nations that breed and harbor terrorists, in countries where drugs are produced and in international organized crime cartels, which are principally headquartered outside our borders; and free and open societies, in a world brought closer together by a technology revolution where information, money and people can move rapidly and easily, are inherently more challenged by these kinds of forces.

We cannot protect ourselves against drug-related crime, track down terrorists, seize international criminals or stop the flow of illegal arms or weapons-related materials without both cooperation among the agencies within our government and the help of countries that are the origin of these forces and whose peace and freedoms are also jeopardized. That is why the President proposed new legislation and initiatives for the U.S. government last year, while also unveiling a new international proposal to work more closely with foreign governments in order to respond more effectively in fighting these forces that challenge our security from within and without.

Finally, the threat of intrusions to our military and commercial information systems poses a significant risk to national security and is being addressed.

Maintaining a Strong Defense Capability

U.S. military forces are critical to the success of our strategy. This nation has unparalleled military capabilities: the United States is the only nation able to conduct large-scale and effective military operations far beyond its borders. This fact, coupled with our unique position as the security partner of choice in many regions, provides a foundation for regional stability through mutually beneficial security partnerships. Our willingness and ability to play a leading role in defending common interests also help ensure that the United States will remain an influential voice in international affairs -- political, military and economic -- that affect our well-being, so long as we retain the military wherewithal to underwrite our commitments credibly.

To protect and advance U.S. interests in the face of the dangers and opportunities outlined earlier, the United States must deploy robust and flexible military forces that can accomplish a variety of tasks:

Deterring and Defeating Aggression in Major Regional Conflicts.
Our forces must be able to help offset the military power of regional states with interests opposed to those of the United States and its allies. To do this, we must be able to credibly deter and defeat aggression by projecting and sustaining U.S. power in more than one region if necessary.

Providing a Credible Overseas Presence.
U.S. forces must also be forward deployed or stationed in key overseas regions in peacetime to deter aggression and advance U.S. strategic interests. Such overseas presence demonstrates our commitment to allies and friends, underwrites regional stability, ensures familiarity with overseas operating environments, promotes combined training among the forces of friendly countries and provides timely initial response capabilities.

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction.
We are devoting greater efforts to stemming the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means, limiting the spread of weapons-related materials and technology, and strengthening accounting and security procedures for global stocks of fissile materials. At the same time, we must improve our capabilities to deter, defend against and prevent the use of such weapons and protect ourselves against their effects.

Contributing to Multilateral Peace Operations.
When our interests call for it, the United States must also be prepared to participate in multilateral efforts to resolve regional conflicts and bolster new democratic governments. Thus, our forces must be ready to participate in peacekeeping, peace enforcement and other operations in support of these objectives.

Supporting Counterterrorism Efforts, Fighting Drug Trafficking and Other National Security Objectives.
A number of other tasks remain that U.S. forces have typically carried out with both general purpose and specialized units. These missions include: counterterrorism, noncombatant evacuation, counter-narcotics operations, special forces assistance to nations and humanitarian and disaster relief operations.

To meet all of these requirements successfully, our forces must be capable of responding quickly and operating effectively as a joint team. That is, they must be ready to fight and win. This imperative demands highly qualified and motivated people; modern, well-maintained equipment; realistic training; strategic mobility; sufficient support and sustainment capabilities; timely intelligence; and a healthy investment in science and technology.

Major Regional Contingencies

The focus of our planning for major theater conflict is on deterring and, if necessary, fighting and defeating aggression by potentially hostile regional powers, such as North Korea, Iran or Iraq. Such states are capable of fielding sizable military forces which can cause serious imbalances in military power within regions important to the United States, with allied or friendly states often finding it difficult to match the power of a potentially aggressive neighbor. To deter aggression, prevent coercion of allied or friendly governments and, ultimately, defeat aggression should it occur, we must prepare our forces to confront this scale of threat, preferably in concert with our allies and friends, but unilaterally if necessary. To do this, we must have forces that can deploy quickly and supplement U.S. forward-based and forward-deployed forces, along with regional allies, in halting an invasion and defeating the aggressor, just as we demonstrated by our rapid response in October 1994 when Iraq threatened aggression against Kuwait.

The forces the Administration fields today are sufficient, in concert with regional allies, to defeat aggression in two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts. Programmed enhancements will sustain and strengthen that capability to meet future threats. As a nation with global interests, it is important that the United States maintain forces with aggregate capabilities on this scale. Obviously, we seek to avoid a situation in which an aggressor in one region might be tempted to take advantage when U.S. forces are heavily committed elsewhere. More basically, maintaining a ’two war’ force helps ensure that the United States will have sufficient military capabilities to deter or defeat aggression by a coalition of hostile powers or by a larger, more capable adversary than we foresee today. The need to deter or defeat aggression in two theaters was demonstrated by the real prospect of near simultaneous hostilities with Iraq and North Korea in the late summer of 1994. The threat of such near simultaneous hostilities and our rapid response in reinforcing our presence and deploying additional forces showed we have a correct and realistic defense strategy. And because tomorrow’s threats are less clear, a strategy for deterring and defeating aggression in more than one theater ensures we maintain the flexibility to meet unknown future threats, while our continued engagement represented by that strategy helps preclude such threats from developing in the first place.

We will never know with certainty how an enemy might fight or precisely what demands might be placed on our own forces in the future. The contributions of allies or coalition partners will vary from place to place and over time. Thus, balanced U.S. forces are needed in order to provide a wide range of complementary capabilities and to cope with the unpredictable and unexpected. Our forces must remain ready and modern to meet future, as well as present, threats or challenges. Integral to these efforts is the development of new systems and capabilities, incorporating state-of-the-art technology and new and more effective combat organizations.

Overseas Presence

The need to deploy U.S. military forces abroad in peacetime is also an important factor in determining our overall force structure. We will maintain robust overseas presence in several forms, such as permanently stationed forces and pre-positioned equipment, deployments and combined exercises, port calls and other force visits, as well as military-to-military contacts. These activities provide several benefits. Specifically they:
  • Give form and substance to our bilateral and multilateral security commitments.

  • Demonstrate our determination to defend U.S. and allied interests in critical regions, deterring hostile nations from acting contrary to those interests.

  • Provide forward elements for rapid response in crises as well as the bases, ports and other infrastructure essential for deployment of U.S.-based forces by air, sea and land.

  • Enhance the effectiveness of coalition operations, including peace operations, by improving our ability to operate with other nations.

  • Allow the United States to use its position of trust to prevent the development of power vacuums and dangerous arms races, thereby underwriting regional stability by precluding threats to regional security.

  • Facilitate regional integration, since nations that may not be willing to work together in our absence may be willing to coalesce around us in a crisis.

  • Promote an international security environment of trust, cooperation, peace and stability, which is fundamental to the vitality of developing democracies and free-market economies for America’s own economic well-being and security.

Through training programs, combined exercises, military contacts, interoperability and shared defense with potential coalition partners, as well as security assistance programs that include judicious foreign military sales, we can strengthen the local self-defense capabilities of our friends and allies. Through active participation in regional security dialogues, we can reduce regional tensions, increase transparency in armaments and improve our bilateral and multilateral cooperation.

By improving the defense capabilities of our friends and demonstrating our commitment to defend common interests, these activities enhance deterrence, encourage responsibility-sharing on the part of friends and allies, decrease the likelihood that U.S. forces will be necessary if conflict arises and raise the odds that U.S. forces will find a relatively favorable situation should a U.S. response be required. U.S. overseas presence visibly supports our strategy of engagement, and we must continually assess the best approaches to achieving its objectives.

Counterterrorism, Fighting Drug Trafficking and Other Missions

While the missions outlined above will remain the primary determinants of our general purpose and nuclear force structure, U.S. military forces and assets will also be called upon to perform a wide range of other important missions as well. Some of these can be accomplished by conventional forces fielded primarily for theater operations. Often, however, these missions call for specialized units and capabilities.

At the same time, the challenges to the security of our citizens, our borders and our democratic institutions from destructive forces such as terrorists and drug traffickers is greater today because of access to modern technology. Cooperation, both within our government and with other nations, is vital in combating these groups that traffic in organized violence.

In October 1995, the President announced a new initiative to work more closely with foreign governments to fight these forces that threaten our security from without and within. Along with other provisions, it includes an invitation to join in the negotiation and endorsement of a declaration on citizen security, which would include a no-sanctuary pledge to terrorists and drug traffickers; a counterterrorism pact; an antinarcotics offensive; and a pledge to end the trafficking of illegal arms and of lethal nuclear, biological and chemical materials. We will continue to share intelligence in anticorruption and money-laundering programs to fight drug trafficking at its source; seek legislation that would prevent arms traders from fueling regional conflicts and subverting international embargoes; and provide increased manpower and funding, strengthened legislation and additional sanctions on states that sponsor terrorism to help protect our citizens.

Combating Terrorism

As long as terrorist groups continue to target American citizens and interests, the United States will need to have specialized units available to defeat such groups. From time to time, we might also find it necessary to strike terrorists at their bases abroad or to attack assets valued by the governments that support them.

Our policy in countering international terrorists is to make no concessions to terrorists, continue to pressure state sponsors of terrorism, fully exploit all available legal mechanisms to punish international terrorists and help other governments improve their capabilities to combat terrorism.

Countering terrorism effectively requires close, day-to-day coordination among Executive Branch agencies. Under the Clinton Administration, the efforts of the Departments of State, Justice and Defense, the FBI and CIA have been coordinated, with increased funding and manpower focused on the problem. Positive results will come from integration of intelligence, diplomatic and rule-of-law activities, and through close cooperation with other governments and international counterterrorist organizations.

Improving U.S. intelligence capabilities is a significant part of the U.S. response, as the evolving nature of the threat presents new challenges to the intelligence community. Terrorists, whether from well-organized groups or the kind of more loosely organized group responsible for the World Trade Center bombing, have the advantage of being able to take the initiative in the timing and choice of targets. Terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction represents a particularly dangerous potential threat that must be countered.

The United States has made concerted efforts to punish and deter terrorists. On June 26, 1993, following a determination that Iraq had plotted an assassination attempt against former President Bush, President Clinton ordered a cruise missile attack against the headquarters of Iraq’s intelligence service in order to send a firm response and deter further threats. Similarly, the United States obtained convictions against defendants in the bombing of the World Trade Center. In the last three years, more terrorists have been arrested and extradited to the United States than during the totality of the previous three Administrations. We are still determined to apprehend many others, including the suspected perpetrators of the Pan Am 103 bombing who are being sheltered in Libya, and those involved in the deadly attack on U.S. Government employees at CIA Headquarters in 1994.

A growing number of nations have responded to the Administrations message urging international cooperation in the fight against terrorism. Our success in hunting down terrorists is in large measure due to a growth of international intelligence sharing and increased international law enforcement efforts. At the Halifax Summit in 1995, the heads of state from the G-7 and Russia agreed to work more closely in combating terrorism. This led to the December 1995 ministerial in Ottawa, which announced a P-8 pledge to adopt all current counterterrorism treaties by the year 2000, to cooperate more closely in detecting forged documents and strengthening border surveillance, to share information more fully and effectively and to work together in preventing the use by terrorists of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.

Iran’s support of terrorism is a primary threat to peace in the Middle East and a major threat to innocent citizens everywhere. The President is determined to step up U.S. efforts bringing international pressure to bear on Iran for its support of terrorism. President Clinton imposed an embargo against Iran, depriving it of the benefits of trade and investment with the United States. The embargo’s immediate effect was to further disrupt an Iranian economy already reeling from mismanagement, corruption and stagnant oil prices. The United States also has sought the support of our friends and allies to adopt policies to limit Teheran’s threatening behavior. The G-7 has joined us in condemning Iran’s support for terrorism, and we have secured commitments fromRussia and other members of the post-COCOM “Wassenaar Arrangement” export control regime not to sell weapons to Iran that have sensitive, dual-use technologies with military end-uses.

U.S. leadership and close coordination with other governments and international bodies will continue, as also demonstrated by the UN Security Council sanctions against Libya for the Pan Am 103 and UTA 772 bombings, an international convention dealing with detecting and controlling plastic explosives, and two important counterterrorism treaties -- the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Aviation and the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Attacks Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation.

Fighting Drug Trafficking

The Administration has undertaken a new approach to the global scourge of drug abuse and trafficking that will better integrate domestic and international activities to reduce both the demand and the supply of drugs. Ultimate success will depend on concerted efforts and partnerships by the public, all levels of government and the American private sector with other governments, private groups and international bodies.

The U.S. shift in strategy from the past emphasis on transit interdiction to a more evenly balanced effort with source countries to build institutions, destroy trafficking organizations and stop supplies of illicit drugs is showing positive results. The leaders of the most influential South American drug mafias, the Medellin and Cali Cartels, have been apprehended. The President also has invoked the International Emergency Economic Powers Act to undercut their financial underpinnings, freezing their assets in the United States and barring U.S. persons from doing business with them. He has announced a major initiative to combat money laundering throughout the globe, and at his direction, the government has identified the front companies and frozen the assets of the Cali Cartel to cut off its economic lifelines and to stop people from dealing unknowingly with its companies.

In addition, the United States, in cooperation with key producing countries, has undertaken initiatives to reinforce its interdiction activities near the source of production. To help root out the corruption in which narcotics trafficking thrives, we are working to support and strengthen democratic institutions abroad. We are also cooperating with governments that demonstrate political will to confront the narcotics threat.

Two comprehensive strategies have been developed, one to deal with the problem of cocaine and another to address the growing threat from high-purity heroin entering this country. We will engage more aggressively with international organizations, financial institutions and nongovernmental organizations in counternarcotics cooperation.

At home and in the international arena, prevention, treatment and economic alternatives must work hand-in-hand with law enforcement and interdiction activities. Long-term efforts will be maintained to help nations develop healthy economies with fewer market incentives for producing narcotics. The United States has increased efforts abroad to foster public awareness and support for governmental cooperation on a broad range of activities to reduce the incidence of drug abuse. Public awareness of a demand problem in producing or trafficking countries can be converted into public support and increased governmental law enforcement to reduce trafficking and production. There has been a significant attitudinal change and awareness in Latin America and the Caribbean, particularly as producer and transit nations themselves become plagued with the ill effects of consumption.

Other Missions

The United States government is also responsible for protecting the lives and safety of Americans abroad. In order to carry out this responsibility, selected U.S. military forces are trained and equipped to evacuate Americans from such situations as the outbreak of civil or international conflict and natural or man-made disasters. For example, U.S. Marines evacuated Americans from Monrovia, Liberia, in August of 1990, and from Mogadishu, Somalia, in December of that year. In 1991, U.S. forces evacuated nearly 20,000 Americans from the Philippines over a three-week period following the eruption of Mount Pinatubo. In 1994, U.S. Marines, coupled with U.S. airlift, deployed to Burundi to help ensure the safe evacuation of U.S. citizens from ethnic fighting in Rwanda.

U.S. forces also provide invaluable training and advice to friendly governments threatened by subversion, lawlessness or insurgency. At any given time, we have small teams of military experts deployed in roughly 25 countries helping host governments cope with such challenges.

U.S. military forces and assets are frequently called upon to provide assistance to victims of floods, storms, drought and other humanitarian disasters. Both at home and abroad, U.S. forces provide emergency food, shelter, medical care and security to those in need.

Finally, the United States will continue as a world leader in space through its technical expertise and innovation. Over the past 30 years, as more and more nations have ventured into space, the United States has steadfastly recognized space as an international region. Since all nations are immediately accessible from space, the maintenance of an international legal regime for space, similar to the concept of freedom of the high seas, is especially important. Numerous attempts have been made in the past to impose legal limitations on access to space by countries that are unable, either technologically or economically, to join space-faring nations. As the commercial importance of space is developed, the United States can expect further pressure from nonparticipants to redefine the status of space, similar to what has been attempted with exclusive economic zones constraining the high seas.

Retaining the current international character of space will remain critical to achieving U.S. national security goals. Our main objectives in this area include:

  • Continued freedom of access to and use of space;

  • Maintaining the U.S. position as the major economic, political, military and technological power in space;

  • Deterring threats to U.S. interests in space and defeating aggressive or hostile acts against U.S. space assets if deterrence fails;

  • Preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction to space;

  • Enhancing global partnerships with other space-faring nations across the spectrum of economic, political and security issues.
Deciding When and How to Employ U.S. Forces

Our strategy calls for the preparation and deployment of American military forces in the United States and abroad to support U.S. diplomacy in responding to key dangers -- those posed by weapons of mass destruction, regional aggression and threats to the stability of states.

Although there may be many demands for U.S. involvement, the need to husband scarce resources requires that we must carefully select the means and level of our participation in particular military operations. And while it is unwise to specify in advance all the limitations we will place on our use of force, we must be as clear as possible about when and how we will use it.

There are three basic categories of national interests that can merit the use of our armed forces. The first involves America’s vital interests, that is, interests that are of broad, overriding importance to the survival, security and vitality of our national entity -- the defense of U.S. territory, citizens, allies and our economic well-being. We will do whatever it takes to defend these interests, including -- when necessary -- the unilateral and decisive use of military power. This was demonstrated clearly in the Persian Gulf through Desert Storm and, more recently, Vigilant Warrior, when Iraq threatened aggression against Kuwait in October 1994.

The second category includes cases in which important, but not vital, U.S. interests are threatened. That is, the interests at stake do not affect our national survival, but they do affect importantly our national well-being and the character of the world in which we live. In such cases, military forces should only be used if they advance U.S. interests, they are likely to be able to accomplish their objectives, the costs and risks of their employment are commensurate with the interests at stake and other means have been tried and have failed to achieve our objectives. Such uses of force should also be selective and limited, reflecting the relative saliency of the interests we have at stake. Haiti and Bosnia are the most recent examples in this category.

The third category involves primarily humanitarian interests. Here, our decisions focus on the resources we can bring to bear by using unique capabilities of our military rather than on the combat power of military force. Generally, the military is not the best tool to address humanitarian concerns. But under certain conditions, the use of our armed forces may be appropriate: when a humanitarian catastrophe dwarfs the ability of civilian relief agencies to respond; when the need for relief is urgent and only the military has the ability to jump-start the longer-term response to the disaster; when the response requires resources unique to the military; and when the risk to American troops is minimal. The relief operation in Rwanda is a good case in point. U.S. military forces performed unique and essential roles, stabilized the situation and then got out, turning the operation over to the international relief community.

The decision on whether and when to use force is therefore dictated first and foremost by our national interests. In those specific areas where our vital or survival interests are at stake, our use of force will be decisive and, if necessary, unilateral.

In other situations posing a less immediate threat, our military engagement must be targeted selectively on those areas that most affect our national interests -- for instance, areas where we have a sizable economic stake or commitments to allies and are as where there is a potential to generate substantial refugee flows into our nation or our allies’.

Second, in all cases, the costs and risks of U.S. military involvement must be judged to be commensurate with the stakes involved. We will be more inclined to act where there is reason to believe that our action will bring lasting improvement. On the other hand, our involvement will be more circumscribed when other regional or multilateral actors are better positioned to act than we are. Even in these cases, however, the United States will be actively engaged at the diplomatic level. But in every case, we will consider several critical questions before committing military force: Have we considered nonmilitary means that offer a reasonable chance of success? Is there a clearly defined, achievable mission? What is the environment of risk we are entering? What is needed to achieve our goals? What are the potential costs -- both human and financial -- of the engagement? Do we have a reasonable likelihood of support from the American people and their elected representatives? Do we have timelines and milestones that will reveal the extent of success or failure, and in either case, do we have an exit strategy?

The decision on how we use force has a similar set of derived guidelines:

First, when we send American troops abroad, we will send them with a clear mission and, for those operations that are likely to involve combat, the means to achieve their objectives decisively, having answered the questions: What types of U.S. military capabilities should be brought to bear, and is the use of military force carefully matched to our political objectives?

Second, as much as possible, we will seek the help of our allies and friends or of relevant international institutions. If our most important national interests are at stake, we are prepared to act alone. But especially on those matters touching directly the interests of our allies, there should be a proportionate commitment from them. Working together increases the effectiveness of each nation’s actions, and sharing the responsibilities lessens everyone’s load.

These, then, are the calculations of interest and cost that have influenced our past uses of military power and will guide us in the future. Every time this Administration has used force, it has balanced interests against costs. And in each case, the use of our military has put power behind our diplomacy, allowing us to make progress we would not otherwise have achieved.

One final consideration regards the central role the American people rightfully play in how the United States wields its power abroad: the United States cannot long sustain a fight without the support of the public, and close consultations with Congress are important to this effort. This is true for humanitarian and other nontraditional interventions, as well as war. Modern media communications confront every American with images that both stir the impulse to intervene and raise the question of an operation’s costs and risks. When it is judged in America’s interest to intervene, we must use force with an unwavering commitment to our objective. While we must continue to reassess any operation’s costs and benefits as it unfolds and the full range of or options, reflexive calls for early withdrawal of our forces as soon as casualties arise endangers our objectives as well as our troops. Doing so invites any rogue actor to attack our troops to try to force our departure from areas where our interests lie.

Combating the Spread and Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles Weapons of mass destruction -- nuclear, biological and chemical -- along with their associated delivery systems, pose a major threat to our security and that of our allies and other friendly nations. Thus, a key part of our strategy is to seek to stem the proliferation of such weapons and to develop an effective capability to deal with these threats. We also need to maintain robust strategic nuclear forces and to implement existing strategic arms agreements.

Nonproliferation and Counterproliferation

A critical priority for the United States is to stem the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and their missile delivery systems. Countries’ weapons programs, and their levels of cooperation with our nonproliferation efforts, will be among our most important criteria in judging the nature of our bilateral relations.

Through programs such as the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction effort and other denuclearization initiatives, important progress has been made to build a more secure international environment by combating the threat posed by the possible theft or diversion of nuclear warheads or their components. One striking example was the successful transfer in 1994 of nearly six hundred kilograms of vulnerable nuclear material from Kazakstan to safe storage in the United States. Kazakstan was concerned about the security of the material and requested U.S. assistance in removing it to safe storage. The Departments of Defense and Energy undertook a joint mission to retrieve the uranium. At the direction of the President, the two Departments have intensified their cooperative programs with Russia and other new independent states to enhance the security of nuclear material. These programs encompass both efforts to improve overall systems for nuclear material protection, control and accounting and targeted efforts to address specific proliferation risks. Under an agreement we secured with Russia, it is converting tons of highly enriched uranium from dismantled weapons into commercial reactor fuel and has begun delivering that fuel to the United States. With the United States and Russia, Ukraine is implementing the Trilateral Statement, which provides for the transfer of all nuclear warheads from Ukraine to Russia for dismantlement in return for fair compensation. Three-quarters of the nuclear weapons located in Ukraine at the beginning of 1994 have now been transferred to Russia for dismantlement. All the nuclear warheads in Kazakstan have been removed, and most are out of Belarus.

A key objective of our nonproliferation strategy was realized in May 1995 when a consensus of the parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) extended the Treaty indefinitely and without conditions. That result ensured that all Americans today, as well as all succeeding generations, can count on the continuation of the Treaty that serves as the bedrock of all global efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons.

Achieving a zero-yield Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty as soon as possible, achieving a cut-off of fissile material production for nuclear weapons purposes and strengthening the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are important goals. They complement our comprehensive efforts to discourage the accumulation of fissile materials, to seek to strengthen controls and constraints on those materials, and over time, to reduce worldwide stocks.

To combat missile proliferation, the United States seeks prudently to broaden membership of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The Administration supports the earliest possible ratification and entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) as well as new measures to deter violations of and enhance compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). We also support improved export controls for nonproliferation purposes both domestically and multilaterally.

The proliferation problem is global, but we must tailor our approaches to specific regional contexts. We have concluded an Agreed Framework to bring North Korea into full compliance with its nonproliferation obligations, including the NPT and IAEA safeguards. The agreement also requires North Korea to freeze and eventually dismantle its indigenous nuclear program under IAEA monitoring. We will continue efforts to prevent Iran from advancing its weapons of mass destruction objectives and to thwart Iraq from reconstituting its previous programs. The United States seeks to cap, reduce and, ultimately, eliminate the nuclear and missile capabilities of India and Pakistan. In the Middle East and elsewhere, we encourage regional arms control agreements that address the legitimate security concerns of all parties. These tasks are being pursued with other states that share our concern for the enormous challenge of stemming the proliferation of such weapons.

The United States has signed bilateral agreements with Russia, Ukraine and South Africa, which commit these countries to adhere to the guidelines of the MTCR. We also secured China’s commitment to observe the MTCR guidelines and its agreement not to transfer MTCR-controlled, ground-to-ground missiles. Russia has agreed not to transfer space-launch vehicle technology with potential military applications to India. South Africa has agreed to dismantle its Category I (500 kilogram payload, 300 kilometer range) missile systems and has joined the NPT and accepted full-scope safeguards. Hungary, the Czech Republic, the Slovakia Republic, Poland and Romania have joined the Australia Group (which controls the transfer of items that could be used to make chemical or biological weapons). Hungary, Argentina, Russia, Brazil and South Africa have joined the MTCR. Argentina, Brazil and Chile have brought the Treaty of Tlatelolco into force. There has been major progress on the dismantlement and removal of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) located in Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakstan. Our Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program has made a significant contribution to this effort.

Thus, the United States seeks to prevent additional countries from acquiring chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them, and will use the full range of its intelligence capabilities to detect such activities. However, should such efforts fail, U.S. forces must be prepared to deter, prevent and defend against their use. As agreed at the January 1994 NATO Summit, we are working with our Allies to develop a policy framework to consider how to reinforce ongoing prevention efforts and to reduce the proliferation threat and protect against it.

The United States will retain the capacity to retaliate against those who might contemplate the use of weapons of mass destruction so that the costs of such use will be seen as outweighing the gains. However, to minimize the impact of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction on our interests, we will need the capability not only to deter their use against either ourselves or our allies and friends but also, where necessary and feasible, to prevent it.

This will require improved defensive and offensive capabilities. To minimize the vulnerability of our forces abroad to weapons of mass destruction, we are placing a high priority on improving our ability to locate, identify and disable arsenals of weapons of mass destruction, production and storage facilities for such weapons and their delivery systems. We also have vigorous and highly effective theater missile defense development programs designed to protect against conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction. Although the intelligence community does not believe that an intercontinental-range missile threat to our homeland is likely to emerge from rogue states in the foreseeable future, we are developing a national missile defense deployable readiness program so we can respond quickly (within 2-3 years) should a sooner-than-expected threat materialize.

Nuclear Forces

In September 1994, the President approved the recommendations of the Pentagon’s Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). A key conclusion of this review is that the United States will retain a triad of strategic nuclear forces sufficient to deter any future hostile foreign leadership with access to strategic nuclear forces from acting against our vital interests and to convince it that seeking a nuclear advantage would be futile. Therefore, we will continue to maintain nuclear forces of sufficient size and capability to hold at risk a broad range of assets valued by such political and military leaders. The President approved the NPR’s recommended strategic nuclear force posture as the U.S. START II force. The forces are: 500 Minuteman ICBMs, 14 Trident submarines all with D-5 missiles, 20 B-2 and 66 B-52 strategic bombers, and a non-nuclear role for the B-1s. This force posture allows us the flexibility to reconstitute or reduce further, as conditions warrant. The NPR also reaffirmed the current posture and deployment of nonstrategic nuclear forces, and the United States has eliminated carrier and surface ship nuclear weapons capability.

Arms Control

Arms control is an integral part of our national security strategy. Arms control can help reduce incentives to initiate attack; enhance predictability regarding the size and structure of forces, thus reducing fear of aggressive intent; reduce the size of national defense industry establishments and thus permit the growth of more vital, nonmilitary industries; ensure confidence in compliance through effective monitoring and verification; and, ultimately, contribute to a more stable and calculable balance of power.

In the area of strategic arms control, prescribed reductions in strategic offensive arms and the steady shift toward less destabilizing systems remain indispensable. Ukraine’s December 1994 accession to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty -- joining Belarus and Kazakstan’s decision to be non-nuclear weapon states -- was followed immediately by the exchange of instruments of ratification and brought the START I treaty into force at the December 1994 CSCE summit, paving the way for the Senate’s advice andconsent for ratification of the 1993 START II Treaty on January 26, 1996. Under START II, the United States and Russia will each be left with between 3,000 and 3,500 deployed strategic nuclear warheads, which is a two-thirds reduction from the Cold War peak. Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin have agreed that once START II is ratified by both countries, both nations will immediately begin to deactivate or otherwise remove from combat status, those systems whose elimination will be required by that treaty, rather than waiting for the treaty to run its course through the year 2003. START II ratification will also open the door to the next round of strategic arms control, in which we will consider what further reductions in, or limitations on, remaining U.S. and Russian nuclear forces should be carried out. We will also explore strategic confidence-building measures and mutual understandings that reduce the risk of accidental war.

The full and faithful implementation of other existing arms control agreements, including the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, Strategic Arms Reduction Talks I (START I), Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, several nuclear testing agreements, the 1994 Vienna Document on Confidence and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs), Open Skies, the Environmental Modification Convention (EnMod), Incidents at Sea and many others will remain an important element of national security policy. The ongoing negotiation initiated by the United States to clarify the ABM Treaty by establishing an agreed demarcation between strategic and theater ballistic missiles, and updating the Treaty to reflect the break-up of the Soviet Union as well as the Administration’s efforts to resolve the CFE flank issue on the basis of a map realignment, reflects the Administration’s commitment to maintaining the integrity and effectiveness of crucial arms control agreements.

Future arms control efforts may become more regional and multilateral. Regional arrangements can add predictability and openness to security relations, advance the rule of international law and promote cooperation among participants. They help maintain deterrence and a stable military balance at regional levels. The U.S. is prepared to promote, help negotiate, monitor and participate in regional arms control undertakings compatible with American national security interests. We will generally support such undertakings but will not seek to impose regional arms control accords against the wishes of affected states. In this regard, the United States, United Kingdom and France announced they would sign the protocols to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone in the first half of 1996.

As arms control, whether regional or global, becomes increasingly multilateral, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva will play an even more important role. The United States will support measures to increase the effectiveness and relevance of the CD. Arms control agreements can head off potential arms races in certain weapons categories or in some environments. We will continue to seek greater transparency, responsibility and, where appropriate, restraint in the transfer of conventional weapons and global military spending. The UN register of conventional arms transfers is a start in promoting greater transparency of weapons transfers and buildups, but more needs to be done.

In February 1995, the President approved a comprehensive policy on transfers of conventional arms that balances legitimate arms sales to support the national security of U.S. allies and friends and the need for multilateral restraint in transferring arms that would undermine stability. The United States has also led international efforts to create the multilateral “Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-use Goods and Technology” -- the successor to the Coordinating Committee for East-West Trade (COCOM) -- to provide a regime for transparency and restraint on dangerous transfers of conventional arms and dual-use technologies. Measures to reduce over-sized defense industrial establishments, especially those parts involved with weapons of mass destruction, will also contribute to stability in the post-Cold War world. The Administration has pursued defense conversion agreements with the former Soviet Union states, and defense conversion is also on the agenda with China. The United States has also proposed a regime to reduce the number and availability of the world’s long-lived antipersonnel mines whose indiscriminate and irresponsible use has reached crisis proportions. In addition, the Administration is leading the international effort to strengthen the laws governing landmine use in the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons. The Administration obtained Senate consent to ratification of this Convention in March 1995.

Peace Operations

In addition to preparing for major regional contingencies and overseas presence, we must prepare our forces for peace operations to support democracy or conflict resolution. The United States, along with others in the international community, will seek to prevent and contain localized conflicts before they require a military response. U.S. support capabilities such as airlift, intelligence and global communications have often contributed to the success of multilateral peace operations, and they will continue to do so. U.S. combat units are less likely to be used for most peace operations, but in some cases their use will be necessary or desirable and justified by U.S. national interests as guided by the Presidential Decision Directive, ’U.S. Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations,’ and outlined below.

Multilateral peace operations are an important component of our strategy. From traditional peacekeeping to peace enforcement, multilateral peace operations are sometimes the best way to prevent, contain or resolve conflicts that could otherwise be far more costly and deadly.

Peace operations often have served, and continue to serve, important U.S. national interests. In some cases, they have helped preserve peace between nations, as in Cyprus and the Golan Heights. In others, peacekeepers have provided breathing room for fledgling democracies, as in Cambodia, El Salvador and Namibia. And in Latin America, the United States, along with fellow Guarantors of the 1942 Rio Protocol Argentina, Brazil and Chile, has contributed to a border monitoring effort to stop fighting between Peru and Ecuador and help achieve a lasting resolution of their border dispute.

At the same time, however, we must recognize that some types of peace operations make demands on the UN that exceed the organization’s capabilities. The United States is working with the UN headquarters and other member states to ensure that the UN embarks only on peace operations that make political and military sense and that the UN is able to manage effectively those peace operations it does undertake. We support the creation of a professional UN peace operations headquarters with a planning staff, access to timely intelligence, a logistics unit that can be rapidly deployed and a modern operations center with global communications. The United States has reduced our peacekeeping payments to 25 percent while working to ensure that other nations pay their fair share. We are also working to ensure that peacekeeping operations by appropriate regional organizations such as NATO and the OSCE can be carried out effectively.

In order to maximize the benefits of UN peace operations, the United States must make highly disciplined choices about when and under what circumstances to support or participate in them. The need to exercise such discipline is at the heart of President Clinton’s policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations. The President’s policy review on peace operations -- the most thorough ever undertaken by an Administration -- requires the United States to undertake a rigorous analysis of requirements and capabilities before voting to support or participate in peace operations. The United States has not hesitated to use its position on the Security Council to ensure that the UN authorizes only those peace operations that meet these standards.

Most UN peacekeeping operations do not involve U.S. forces. On those occasions when we consider contributing U.S. forces to a UN peace operation, we will employ rigorous criteria, including the same principles that would guide any decision to employ U.S. forces. In addition, we will ensure that the risks to U.S. personnel and the command and control arrangements governing the participation of American and foreign forces are acceptable to the United States.

The question of command and control is particularly critical. There may be times when it is in our interest to place U.S. troops under the temporary operational control of a competent UN or allied commander. The United States has done so many times in the past -- from the siege of Yorktown in the Revolutionary War to the battles of Desert Storm. However, under no circumstances will the President ever relinquish his command authority over U.S. forces.

Improving the ways the United States and the UN decide upon and conduct peace operations will not make the decision to engage any easier. The lesson we must take away from our first ventures in peace operations is not that we should forswear such operations but that we should employ this tool selectively and more effectively. In short, the United States views peace operations as a means to support our national security strategy, not as a strategy unto itself.

The President is firmly committed to securing the active support of the Congress for U.S. participation in peace operations. The Administration has set forth a detailed blueprint to guide consultations with Congress. With respect to particular operations, the Administration will undertake consultations on questions such as the nature of expected U.S. military participation, the mission parameters of the operation, the expected duration and budgetary implications. In addition to such operation-specific consultations, the Administration has also conducted regular monthly briefings for congressional staff and will deliver an Annual Comprehensive Report to Congress on Peace Operations. Congress is critical to the institutional development of a successful U.S. policy on peace operations, including the resolution of funding issues that have an impact on military readiness.

Two other points deserve emphasis. First, the primary mission of our Armed Forces is not peace operations; it is to deter and, if necessary, to fight and win conflicts in which our most important interests are threatened. Second, while the international community can create conditions for peace, the responsibility for peace ultimately rests with the people of the country in question.

trong Intelligence Capabilities

U.S. intelligence capabilities are critical instruments of our national power and integral to implementing our national security strategy. Strong intelligence capabilities are needed to protect our nation by providing warning of threats to U.S. national security, by providing support to the policy and military communities to prevail over these threats and by identifying opportunities for advancing our national interests through support to diplomacy. Decisionmakers, military commanders and policy analysts at all levels rely on the intelligence community to collect information unavailable from other sources and to provide strategic and tactical analysis to help surmount challenges to our national interests and security.

Because of the change in the security environment since the end of the Cold War, intelligence must address a wider range of threats and policy needs. In this demanding environment, the intelligence community must maintain its global reach, refine and further focus its collection efforts and work even more closely with the policy departments. Moreover, its analytic effort must provide a coherent framework to help senior U.S. officials manage a complex range of military, political and economic issues. Intelligence emphasis must be placed on preserving and enhancing those collection and analytic capabilities that provide unique information against those states and groups that pose the most serious threats to U.S. security.

To build greater focus, direction and responsiveness into these intelligence activities, the President last year signed a Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) on intelligence priorities. This Directive established for the first time a series of categories of intelligence needs. This PDD is a flexible document designed to accommodate shifting priorities within the categories. Current Presidential priorities include:

  • Warning and management of threats that pose a direct or immediate threat to U.S. interests.

  • "Rogue states" whose policies are consistently hostile to the United States.

  • Countries that possess strategic nuclear forces that can pose a threat to the United States and its allies.

  • Command and control of nuclear weapons and control of nuclear fissile materials.

  • Transnational threats such as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international narcotics trafficking, international terrorism and international organized crime.

  • Ongoing or potential major regional conflicts where the United States has national security interests.

  • Intensified counterintelligence against hostile foreign intelligence services.

U.S. intelligence must not only monitor traditional threats but also assist the policy community to forestall new and emerging threats, especially those of a transnational nature. In carrying out these responsibilities, the intelligence community must:

  • Support U.S. military operations worldwide. Whenever U.S. forces are deployed, the highest priority is to ensure that our military commanders receive the timely information required to execute successfully their mission while minimizing the loss of American lives.

  • Support diplomatic efforts in pursuit of U.S. foreign policy objectives by providing policymakers and diplomats timely intelligence on political developments in key areas such as the Middle East, the Balkans and North Korea.

  • Provide worldwide capabilities to detect, identify and deter efforts of foreign nations to develop weapons of mass destruction and ancillary delivery systems.

  • Gather information on terrorist activities aimed at U.S. persons or interests and help thwart such activities whether conducted by well-organized groups or loose associations of disaffected individuals intent on striking at the United States.

  • Provide worldwide capabilities to gather timely intelligence on current and emerging information technologies or infrastructure that may potentially threaten U.S. interests at home or abroad.

  • Contribute where appropriate to policy efforts aimed at bolstering our economic prosperity.

  • Provide the timely information necessary to monitor treaties, promote democracy and free markets, forge alliances and track emerging threats.

The collection and analysis of economic intelligence will play an increasingly important role in helping policymakers understand economic trends. Economic intelligence can help by identifying threats to private U.S. economic enterprises from foreign intelligence services as well as unfair trading practices. Intelligence must also identify emerging threats that could affect the international economy and the stability of some nation states, such as the upsurge in international organized crime and illegal trafficking in narcotics.

The development and implementation of U.S. policies to promote democracy abroad relies on sound intelligence support. In order to forecast adequately dangers to democracy abroad, the intelligence community and policy departments must track political, economic, social and military developments in those parts of the world where U.S. interests are most heavily engaged and where collection of information from open sources is inadequate. This often leads to early warning of potential crises and facilitates preventive diplomacy.

Improving the management of intelligence resources and focusing on the principal concerns of policymakers and military commanders enhances the value of intelligence and contributes to our national well-being. The establishment, for example, of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency will provide a more integrated imagery capability that will be especially important in providing warning of threats to U.S. and allied interests and in supporting crisis management and military operations. Intelligence producers must develop closer relationships with the users of intelligence to make products more responsive to current consumer needs. This includes identifying emerging threats to modern information systems and supporting the development of protection strategies. The continuous availability of intelligence, especially during crises, is of crucial importance. Also underlying all intelligence activities must be an increased awareness of, and enhanced capabilities in, counterintelligence. Finally, to enhance the study and support of worldwide environmental, humanitarian and disaster relief activities, technical intelligence assets -- especially imagery -- must be directed to a greater degree toward collection of data on these subjects.

Fighting International Organized Crime

International organized crime jeopardizes the global trend toward peace and freedom, undermines fragile new democracies, saps the strength from developing countries and threatens our efforts to build a safer, more prosperous world. The rise of organized crime in the new independent states of the former Soviet Union and Central Europe weakens new democracies and poses a direct threat to U.S. interests, particularly in light of the potential for the theft and smuggling by organized criminals of nuclear materials left within some of these nations.

The Administration has launched a major initiative to combat international organized crime. Criminal enterprises are presently moving vast sums of illegal gains through the international financial system with impunity. In addition to invoking the International Emergency Economic Powers Act to undercut the financial underpinnings of criminal enterprises, the President has ordered an action plan to combat money laundering throughout the globe by directing the government to identify and put on notice nations that tolerate money laundering. We intend to work with these nations to bring their banks and financial systems into conformity with the international standards against moneylaundering -- or we will consider sanctions. The Justice Department is also drafting legislation, which will be submitted to Congress, to provide U.S. agencies with the tools they need to respond to organized criminal activity.

Because the threat of organized crime comes from abroad as well as at home, we will work with other nations to keep our citizens safe. The President’s invitation at the United Nations to all countries to join the United States in fighting international organized crime by measures of their own and by negotiating and endorsing an international declaration on citizens’ safety -- a declaration which would include a “no-sanctuary for organized criminals” pledge -- is an effort to enhance our international cooperative efforts to protect our people.

International crime organizations target nations whose law enforcement agencies lack the experience and capacity to stop them. To help police in the new democracies of Central Europe, Hungary and the United States established an international law enforcement academy in Budapest. The President also proposed last year at the United Nations an effective police partnership that would establish a network of such centers around the world to share the latest crime-fighting techniques and technology.

The President’s initiative also targeted the criminal or quasi-legal enterprises that have begun to develop an enormous gray-market trade in illegal weapons. By forging documents or diverting deliveries of armaments, these networks have been able to move weapons to areas of conflict or instability. The graymarket continues to fuel insurgencies and subvert international arms embargoes. These networks serve criminals and terrorists alike, and parasitically feed off and ultimately threaten, the open markets and open societies that we have worked so hard to advance.

National Security Emergency Preparedness

We will do all we can to prevent destructive forces such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, threats to our information systems and catastrophes from within such as natural disasters, from endangering our citizens. But we must also be prepared to respond effectively if an emergency does occur in order to ensure the survivability of our institutions and national infrastructure, protect lives and property and preserve our way of life. National security emergency preparedness is imperative, and we must continue to work aggressively to ensure appropriate threat mitigation and response capabilities, including the ability to restore to normalcy elements of our society affected by national security emergencies or disasters resulting in widespread disruption, destruction, injury or death. To this end, comprehensive, all-hazard emergency preparedness planning by all Federal departments and agencies continues to be a crucial national security requirement.

The Environment and Sustainable Development

The more clearly we understand the complex interrelationships between the different parts of our world’s environment, the better we can understand the regional and even global consequences of local changes to the environment. Increasing competition for the dwindling reserves of uncontaminated air, arable land, fisheries and other food sources and water, once considered ’free’ goods, is already a very real risk to regional stability around the world. The range of environmental risks serious enough to jeopardize international stability extends to massive population flight from man-made or natural catastrophes, such as Chernobyl or the East African drought, and to large-scale ecosystem damage caused by industrial pollution, deforestation, loss of biodiversity, ozone depletion, desertification, ocean pollution and, ultimately, climate change. Strategies dealing with environmental issues of this magnitude will require partnerships between governments and nongovernmental organizations, cooperation between nations and regions, sustained scientific research and a commitment to a strategically focused, long-term policy for emerging environmental risks.

The decisions we make today regarding military force structures typically influence our ability to respond to threats 20 to 30 years in the future. Similarly, our current decisions regarding the environment and natural resources will affect the magnitude of their security risks over at least a comparable period of time, if not longer. The measure of our difficulties in the future will be settled by the steps we take in the present.

As a priority initiative, the U.S. successfully led efforts at the Cairo Conference to develop a consensus Program of Action to address the continuous climb in global population, including increased availability of family planning and reproductive health services, sustainable economic development, the empowerment of women to include enhanced educational opportunities and a reduction in infant and child mortality. Rapid population growth in the developing world and unsustainable consumption patterns in industrialized nations are the root of both present and potentially even greater forms of environmental degradation and resource depletion. A conservative estimate of the globe’s population projects 8.5 billion people on the planet by the year 2025. Even when making the most generous allowances for advances in science and technology, one cannot help but conclude that population growth and environmental pressures will feed into immense social unrest and make the world substantially more vulnerable to serious international frictions.

Promoting Prosperity at Home

A central goal of our national security strategy is to promote America’s prosperity through efforts both at home and abroad. Our economic and security interests are increasingly inseparable. Our prosperity at home depends on engaging actively abroad. The strength of our diplomacy, our ability to maintain an unrivaled military, the attractiveness of our values abroad -- all these depend in part on the strength of our economy.

Enhancing American Competitiveness

Our primary economic goal is to strengthen the American economy. The first step toward that goal was reducing the federal deficit and the burden it imposes on the economy and future generations. The economic program passed in 1993 has restored investor confidence in the United States and strengthened our position in international economic negotiations. Under the Clinton economic plan, the federal budget deficit as a percentage of the Gross Domestic Product was lowered from 4.9 percent in Fiscal Year 1992 to 2.4 percent in Fiscal Year 1995 -- the lowest since 1979. And Fiscal Year 1995 was the first time that the deficit has been reduced three years in a row since the Truman Administration. We are building on this deficit reduction effort with other steps to improve American competitiveness: investing in science and technology; assisting integration of the commercial and military industrial sectors; improving information networks and other vital infrastructure; and improving education and training programs for America’s workforce. We are structuring our defense R&D effort to place greater emphasis on dual-use technologies that allow the military to capitalize on commercial-sector innovation for lower cost, higher quality and increased performance. We are also reforming the defense acquisition system so that we can develop and procure weapons and materiel more efficiently.

Strengthening Macroeconomic Coordination

As national economies become more integrated internationally, the United States cannot thrive in isolation from developments abroad. International economic expansion is benefiting from G-7 macroeconomic policy coordination. Our work to strengthen an effective, cooperative G-7 dialogue has led to better economic growth in the G-7 countries. In the United States, economic trends point to continued economic strength and sustained expansion. Conditions for growth among our G-7 partners appear to be in place for most countries, and inflation is well under control.

Enhancing Access to Foreign Markets

The success of American business and our ability to create quality jobs for our workers is more than ever dependent upon success in exporting to international markets. The ability to compete internationally also assures that our companies will continue to innovate and increase productivity, which in turn will lead to improvements in our own living standards. But to compete abroad, our firms need access to foreign markets, just as foreign industries have access to our open market. We vigorously pursue measures to increase access for our goods and services -- through bilateral, regional and multilateral arrangements.

Export Strategy and Advocacy Program

In 1993, the Administration published a report creating America’s first national export strategy and making 65 specific recommendations for reforming the way government works with the private sector to expand exports. Among the recommendations were significant improvements in advocacy, export financing, market information systems and product standards education. Our objective is to expand U.S. exports to over $1.2 trillion by the year 2000, which would mean some 5 million new American jobs and a total of some 16 million jobs supported by exports by the turn of the century.

Our export strategy is working.
Since this Administration took office, the United States has regained its position from Germany as the world’s largest exporter. We have designed and begun implementing new approaches to promoting exports, notably our strategy of focusing upon the ten “Big Emerging Markets” that will take more than a quarter of the world’s imports by the year 2010. Our strong export performance has supported as many as 2 million new, export-related jobs since January 1993. But we know that we need to export more in the years ahead if we are to reduce further our trade deficit and raise living standards with high-wage jobs.

Export Controls

Another critical element in boosting U.S. exports is reforming the outdated export licensing system. In September 1993, we liberalized controls on more than $30 billion of computer exports, and in March 1994, we eliminated controls on virtually all civilian telecommunications equipment to the former Soviet Union, Central and Eastern Europe and China. The Administration is also seeking comprehensive reform of the Export Administration Act, which governs the process of export licensing. The goal of this reform is to strengthen our ability to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and protect other national interests, while removing unnecessarily burdensome licensing requirements left over from the Cold War. In 1995, we eliminated controls on the export of computers to our closest allies and liberalized controls on other computer exports consistent with our national security interests.

Expanding the Realm of Open Markets

The conclusion of NAFTA, the Uruguay Round of GATT, the Bogor Declaration of the 1994 APEC leaders meeting and 1995 Osaka Action Plan, the Summit of the Americas’ Action Plan and the U.S.-EU Transatlantic Marketplace represent unprecedented progress toward more open markets both at the regional and global levels. The Administration intends to continue its efforts in further enhancing U.S. access to foreign markets. The World Trade Organization (WTO) will provide a new institutional lever for securing such access. Emerging markets, particularly along the Pacific Rim, present vast opportunities for American enterprise, and APEC now provides a suitable vehicle for the exploration of such opportunities. Similarly, the United States convened the Summit of the Americas to seize the opportunities created by the movement toward open markets throughout the hemisphere. The Transatlantic Marketplace launched with the European Union in Madrid in December 1995, will further expand our economic ties. All such steps in the direction of expanded trading relationships will be undertaken in a way consistent with protection of the international environment and towards the goal of sustainable development here and abroad.

The North American Free Trade Agreement

On December 3, 1993, President Clinton signed the North American Free Trade Act (NAFTA), which creates a free trade zone among the United States, Canada and Mexico. NAFTA has already created nearly 310,000 American jobs because of exports to our NAFTA partners. NAFTA has also increased Mexico’s capacity to cooperate with our nation on a wide range of issues that cross our 2,000 mile border -- including the environment, narcotics trafficking and illegal immigration. This Free Trade Act helped insulate our trade relationship with Mexico and protect and increase U.S. exports to that country -- and the jobs they support -- during the 1995 Mexican financial crisis and the subsequent economic recession and adjustment period. We have also begun negotiations with Chile on expanding NAFTA’s membership.

Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation

Our economic relations depend vitally on our ties with the Asia Pacific region, which is the world’s fastest-growing economic area. In November 1993, President Clinton convened the first-ever summit of the leaders of the economies that constitute the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. U.S. initiatives in the APEC forum will open new opportunities for economic cooperation and permit U.S. companies to expand their involvement in substantial infrastructure planning and construction throughout the region. The trade and investment framework agreed to in 1993 provided the basis for enhancing the ’open regionalism’ that defines APEC. At the second leaders meeting in November 1994, APEC leaders embraced the goal of free and open trade and investment throughout the region by 2020. A third meeting in Osaka, Japan, in 1995 adopted an action agenda for facilitating and measuring progress toward that goal.

Uruguay Round of GATT

The successful conclusion in December 1993 of the Uruguay Round of the negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), after seven years and three “final” deadlines, significantly strengthened the world trading system. The Uruguay Round accord is the largest, most comprehensive trade agreement in history. It will reduce tariffs by 40 percent and extend trade rules to agriculture, services and international property rights. The U.S. economy is expected to gain $150 billion per year in GNP once the Uruguay Round is fully phased in, which will create hundreds of thousands of new U.S. jobs and expand opportunities for U.S. businesses. Working with Congress, the President secured U.S. approval of this pathbreaking agreement and the resulting World Trade Organization, which provides a forum to resolve disputes openly. The President remains committed to ensuring that the commitments in the Uruguay Round agreement are fulfilled.

U.S. - Japan Framework Agreement

The Administration continues to make progress with Asias largest economy and Americas second largest trading partner in increasing market access and strengthening sustainable economic growth internationally. Since the U.S.-Japan Framework for Economic Partnership was established by President Clinton and Prime Minister Miyazawa in 1993, we have reached 20 market access agreements with Japan covering a range of key sectors, such as medical technologies, telecommunications, insurance, flat glass, financial services and intellectual property rights. Our merchandise exports to Japan in the sectors covered by these agreements have expanded at a rate that is more than double that of export growth to Japan in the noncovered sectors. In August 1995, we concluded a landmark agreement in automobile and auto parts trade, the largest sector of our bilateral trade deficit, and last summer we took steps to support market access for U.S. transport services.

The Administration is committed to ensuring that competitive American goods and services have fair access to the Japanese market. In addition, the Administration is working with Japan to address common challenges to sustainable economic development through the Frameworks Common Agenda for Cooperation in Global Perspective. Partnerships have been strengthened in the environment, human health and advanced technology development, and new initiatives were launched this year that address education, food security, counter-terrorism, natural disaster mitigation, combating emerging infectious diseases and nation-building. This Administration will continue to seek partnerships that help both nations fulfill our international responsibilities as the worlds two largest economies.

Summit of the Americas

America’s economy benefits enormously from the opportunity offered by the commitment of the 34 democratic nations of the Western Hemisphere to negotiate by 2005 a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) . The Western Hemisphere is our largest export market, constituting over 35 percent of all U.S. sales abroad. The action plan will accelerate progress toward free, integrated markets that will create new, high-wage jobs and sustain economic growth for America. The June 1995 Trade Ministerial created seven working groups to begin preparations for the negotiation of the FTAA.

U.S.-EU Transatlantic Marketplace

On December 3, 1995, President Clinton launched the New Transatlantic Agenda at the U.S.-EU Summit in Madrid, Spain. As part of this agenda, the United States and the European Union (EU) agreed to take concrete steps to reduce barriers to trade and investment through the creation of a New Transatlantic Marketplace. The United States and the EU also will explore the possibility of agreeing on further tariff reductions and accelerated reductions in tariffs already agreed to in the Uruguay Round; negotiate agreements on mutual recognition of certification and testing procedures; conclude a customs cooperation and mutual assistance agreement; carry out a joint study of tariff and nontariff barriers to trade and options for their elimination; and work together in the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the WTO to achieve agreements on foreign investment and telecommunications services.

OECD Multilateral Investment Agreement

In May 1995, the United States helped launch OECD negotiations of a Multilateral Agreement on Investment, which will be a state-of-the-art investment agreement. The negotiations are intended to conclude by 1996. There is already broad consensus that the agreement will be based on high standards, including national and most-favored-nation treatment, and that exceptions would be limited and narrowly drawn. We are seeking to establish clear legal standards on expropriation, access to binding international arbitration for disputes and unrestricted investment-related transfers across borders. If successful, these negotiations would help further our efforts on investment issues in Asia and in the WTO.

Preparing International Economic Institutions for the 21st Century

At the initiative of President Clinton at the Naples Economic Summit in 1994, the G-7 undertook an intensive review of the international financial and economic institutions to consider how to prepare them for the 21st Century. At the following year’s summit in Halifax, Canada, the G-7 proposed a number of important reforms and initiatives. These include measures to improve our capacity to prevent and mitigate international financial crises; the creation of a more effective early warning and prevention system with an emphasis on improved disclosure of financial and economic data; the establishment of a new Emergency Financing Mechanism to provide the means for a quick and surgical international response to crises with systemic implications; a doubling of the resources available under the General Arrangement to Borrow, including from new participants with a stake in the system; and instituting a review of procedures that might facilitate the orderly resolution of international debt crises in a financial environment characterized by a greater diversity of creditors and financial instruments. Another important area considered at Halifax concerns international financial regulation. The G-7 leaders committed to intensify cooperation among financial authorities to limit systemic risk and pledged to develop and enhance safeguards, standards, transparency and systems to reduce risk.

At Halifax, the G-7 leaders also endorsed a blueprint for reforms of the World Bank and the regional development banks -- reforms that the United States has been promoting for two and a half years. Key elements include: substantially increasing the share of resources devoted to basic social programs that invest in people and are a powerful force for poverty reduction, such as primary education for girls and basic health care; focus on safeguarding the environment; support for development of the private sector and the use of more innovative financial instruments to catalyze private capital flows; and internal reforms of the multilateral development banks, including consolidation, decentralization, increased transparency and cost reduction.

roviding for Energy Security

The United States depends on oil for more than 40% of its primary energy needs. Roughly half of our oil needs are met with imports, and a large share of these imports come from the Persian Gulf area. The experiences of the two oil shocks and the Gulf War show that an interruption of oil supplies can have a significant impact on the economies of the United States and its allies. Appropriate economic responses can substantially mitigate the balance of payments and inflationary impacts of an oil shock; appropriate security policy responses to events such as Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait can limit the magnitude of the crisis.

Over the longer term, the United States’ dependence on access to foreign oil sources will be increasingly important as our resources are depleted. The U.S. economy has grown roughly 75% since the first oil shock; yet during that time our oil consumption has remained virtually stable and oil production has declined. High oil prices did not generate enough new oil exploration and discovery to sustain production levels from our depleted resource base. These facts show the need for continued and extended reliance on energy efficiency and conservation and development of alternative energy sources. Conservation measures notwithstanding, the United States has a vital interest in unrestricted access to this critical resource.

Promoting Sustainable Development Abroad

Broad-based economic development not only improves the prospects for democratic development in developing countries but also expands the demands for U.S. exports. Economic growth abroad can alleviate pressure on the global environment, reduce the attraction of illegal narcotics trade and improve the health and economic productivity of global populations.

The environmental consequences of ill-designed economic growth are clear. Environmental damage will ultimately block economic growth. Rapid urbanization is outstripping the ability of nations to provide jobs, education and other services to new citizens.

The continuing poverty of a quarter of the world’s people leads to hunger, malnutrition, economic migration and political unrest. Widespread illiteracy and lack of technical skills hinder employment opportunities and drive entire populations to support themselves on increasingly fragile and damaged resource bases. New diseases, such as AIDS, and other epidemics which can be spread through environmental degradation, threaten to overwhelm the health facilities of developing countries, disrupt societies and stop economic growth. Developing countries must address these realities with national sustainable development policies that offer viable alternatives. U.S. leadership is of the essence to facilitate that process. If such alternatives are not developed, the consequences for the planet’s future will be grave indeed.

Domestically, the United States is working hard to halt local and cross-border environmental degradation. In addition, the United States is fostering environmental technology that targets pollution prevention, control and cleanup. Companies that invest in energy efficiency, clean manufacturing and environmental services today will create the high-quality, high-wage jobs of tomorrow. By providing access to these types of technologies, our exports can also provide the means for other nations to achieve environmentally sustainable economic growth. At the same time, we are taking ambitious steps at home to better manage our natural resources and reduce energy and other consumption, decrease waste generation and increase our recycling efforts.

Internationally, the Administration’s foreign assistance program focuses on four key elements of sustainable development: broad-based economic growth; the environment; population and health; and democracy. We will continue to advocate environmentally sound private investment and responsible approaches by international lenders. As mentioned above, the Multilateral Development Banks (MDB’s) are now placing increased emphasis upon sustainable development in their funding decisions, to include a commitment to perform environmental assessments on projects for both internal and public scrutiny. In particular, the Global Environmental Facility (GEF), established in 1994, provides a source of financial assistance to the developing world for climate change, biodiversity and oceans initiatives that will benefit all the world’s citizens, including Americans.

The U.S. is taking specific steps in all of these areas:

  • In June 1993, the United States signed the Convention on Biological Diversity, which aims to protect and utilize the world’s genetic inheritance. The Interior Department created a National Biological Service to help protect species and to help the agricultural and biotechnical industries identify new sources of food, fiber and medications.

  • New policies are being implemented to ensure the sustainable management of U.S. forests by the year 2000, as pledged internationally. In addition, U.S. bilateral forest assistance programs are being expanded, and the United States is promoting sustainable management of tropical forests.

  • In the wake of the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, the United States has undertaken initiatives to reduce land-based sources of marine pollution, maintain populations of marine species at healthy and productive levels and protect endangered marine mammals and coral reefs.

  • The United States has focused technical assistance and encouraged nongovernmental environmental groups to provide expertise to the new independent states of the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern European nations that have suffered the most acute environmental crises. The Agency for International Development, the Environmental Protection Agency and other U.S. agencies are engaged in technical cooperation with many countries around the world to advance these goals. The United States has also been working bilaterally with a number of developing countries to promote their sustainable development and to work jointly on global environmental issues.

  • The Administration is leading a renewed global effort to address population problems and promote international consensus for stabilizing world population growth. Our comprehensive approach stresses family planning and reproductive health care, maternal and child health, education and improving the status of women. The 1994 International Conference on Population and Development held in Cairo, endorsed these approaches as important strategies in achieving our global population goals. At the 1995 UN Conference on Women in Beijing, the United States promoted women’s -- and children’s -- international rights.

  • With regard to the United Nations, the G-7 leaders at the Halifax Summit in 1995 endorsed an ambitious effort to modernize the organization’s economic and social functions through better coordination, consolidation of related agencies, rethinking agency mandates and creating an effective management culture in a smaller and more focused Secretariat. Following President Clinton’s call for a UN reform commission, the UN General Assembly established the High Level Working Group on Strengthening the UN System in September 1995.

  • In April 1993, President Clinton pledged that the United States would reduce our greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000, in accordance with the Framework Convention on Climate Change. In March 1995, we and other parties to the Convention agreed to negotiate steps to be taken beyond the year 2000. We are resolved to deal forcefully with this threat to our planet while preserving U.S. economic competitiveness.

  • The United States and other countries have agreed to protect the ozone layer by phasing out use of the major ozone-depleting substances. In 1995, we also agreed with other nations to decrease use of additional ozone-depleting chemicals.

Promoting Democracy

All of America’s strategic interests -- from promoting prosperity at home to checking global threats abroad before they threaten our territory -- are served by enlarging the community of democratic and free-market nations. Thus, working with new democratic states to help preserve them as democracies committed to free markets and respect for human rights, is a key part of our national security strategy.

One of the most gratifying and encouraging developments of the past 15 years is the explosion in the number of states moving away from repressive governance and toward democracy. Since the success of many of those experiments is by no means assured, our strategy of enlargement must focus on the consolidation of those regimes and the broadening of their commitment to democracy. At the same time, we seek to increase respect for fundamental human rights in all states and encourage an evolution to democracy where that is possible.

The enlargement of the community of market democracies respecting human rights and the environment is manifest in a number of ways:

  • More than 30 nations in Central and Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, Latin America, Africa and East Asia have, over the past 10 years, adopted the structures of a constitutional democracy and held free elections;

  • The nations of the Western Hemisphere have proclaimed their commitment to democratic regimes and to the collective responsibility of the nations of the OAS to respond to threats to democracy.

  • In the Western Hemisphere, only Cuba is not a democratic state.

  • Nations as diverse as South Africa and Cambodia have resolved bitter internal disputes with agreement on the creation of constitutional democracies.

The first element of our enlargement strategy is to work with the other democracies of the world and to improve our cooperation with them on security and economic issues. We also seek their support in enlarging the realm of democratic nations.

The core of our strategy is to help democracy and free-markets expand and survive in other places where we have the strongest security concerns and where we can make the greatest difference. This is not a democratic crusade; it is a pragmatic commitment to see freedom take hold where that will help us most. Thus, we must target our effort to assist states that affect our strategic interests, such as those with large economies, critical locations, nuclear weapons or the potential to generate refugee flows into our own nation or into key friends and allies. We must focus our efforts where we have the most leverage. And our efforts must be demand-driven -- they must focus on nations whose people are pushing for reform or have already secured it.

Russia is a key state in this regard. If we can support and help consolidate democratic and market reforms in Russia -- and in the other new independent states -- we can help turn a former threat into a region of valued diplomatic and economic partnership. Our intensified interaction with Ukraine has helped move that country onto the path of economic reform, which is critical to its long-term stability. In addition, our efforts in Russia, Ukraine and the other states support and facilitate our efforts to achieve continued reductions in nuclear arms and compliance with international nonproliferation accords.

The new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe are another clear example, given their proximity to the great democratic powers of Western Europe, their importance to our security and their potential markets. Eventual integration into European security and economic organizations, such as NATO and the EU, will help lock in and preserve the impressive progress in instituting democratic and market-economic reforms that these nations have made.

Since our ties across the Pacific are no less important than those across the Atlantic, pursuing enlargement in the Asia Pacific theater is a third example. We will work to support the emerging democracies of the region and to encourage other states along the same path.

Continuing the great strides toward democracy and markets in our hemisphere is also a key concern and was behind the President’s decision to host the Summit of the Americas in December 1994. As we continue such efforts, we should be on the lookout for states whose entry into the camp of market democracies may influence the future direction of an entire region; South Africa now holds that potential with regard to sub-Saharan Africa.

How should the United States help consolidate and enlarge democracy and markets in these states? The answers are as varied as the nations involved, but there are common elements. We must continue to help lead the effort to mobilize international resources, as we have with Russia, Ukraine and the other new independent states. We must be willing to take immediate public positions to help staunch democratic reversals, as we have in Haiti and Guatemala. We must give democratic nations the fullest benefits of integration into foreign markets, which is part of why NAFTA and the Uruguay Round of GATT ranked so high on our agenda. And we must help these nations strengthen the pillars of civil society, improve their market institutions and fight corruption and political discontent through practices of good governance.

At the same time as we work to ensure the success of emerging democracies, we must also redouble our efforts to guarantee basic human rights on a global basis. At the 1993 United Nations Conference on Human Rights, the United States forcefully and successfully argued for a reaffirmation of the universality of such rights and improved international mechanisms for their promotion. In the wake of this gathering, the UN has named a High Commissioner for Human Rights, and the rights of women have been afforded a new international precedence. The United States has taken the lead in assisting the UN to set up international tribunals to enforce accountability for the war crimes in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda. And the President has endorsed the creation of a Permanent Criminal Court to address violations of international humanitarian law.

The United States also continues to work for the protection of human rights on a bilateral basis. To demonstrate our own willingness to adhere to international human rights standards, the United States ratified the international convention prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race and the President signed the international convention on the rights of the child. The Administration is seeking Senate consent to ratification for the convention prohibiting discrimination against women. The United States played a major role in promoting women’s rights internationally at the UN Women’s Conference in September.

In all these efforts, a policy of engagement and enlargement should take on a second meaning: we should pursue our goals through an enlarged circle not only of government officials but also of private and nongovernmental groups. Private firms are natural allies in our efforts to strengthen market economies. Similarly, our goal of strengthening democracy and civil society has a natural ally in labor unions, human rights groups, environmental advocates, chambers of commerce and election monitors. Just as we rely on force multipliers in defense, we should welcome these diplomacy multipliers, such as the National Endowment for Democracy.

Supporting the global movement toward democracy requires a pragmatic and long-term effort focused on both values and institutions. The United States must build on the opportunities achieved through the successful conclusion of the Cold War. Our long-term goal is a world in which each of the major powers is democratic, with many other nations joining the community of market democracies as well.

Our efforts to promote democracy and human rights are complemented by our humanitarian assistance programs which are designed to alleviate human suffering and to pave the way for progress towards establishing democratic regimes with a commitment to respect for human rights and appropriate strategies for economic development. We are encouraging ideas such as the suggestion of Argentina’s President Menem for the creation of an international civilian rapid response capability for humanitarian crises, including a school and training for humanitarian operations.

Through humanitarian assistance and policy initiatives aimed at the sources of disruption, we seek to mitigate the contemporary migration and refugee crises, foster long-term global cooperation and strengthen involved international institutions. The United States will provide appropriate financial support and will work with other nations and international bodies, such as the International Red Cross and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, in seeking voluntary repatriation of refugees -- taking into full consideration human rights concerns as well as the economic conditions that may have driven them out in the first place. Helping refugees return to their homes in Mozambique, Afghanistan, Eritrea, Somalia and Guatemala, for example, is a high priority.

Relief efforts will continue for people displaced by the conflict in Bosnia and other republics of the former Yugoslavia. We will act in concert with other nations and the UN against the illegal smuggling of aliens into this country. In concert with the tools of diplomatic, economic and military power, our humanitarian and refugee policies can bear results, as was evident in Haiti. We provided temporary safe haven at Guantanamo Naval Base for those Haitians who feared for their safety and left by sea until we helped restore democracy.